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How should the Judiciary structure its reasoning in determining the amount 
of deference it gives to executive-branch treaty interpretations? This question is 
evermore crucial as international agreements, notably those related to the "war 
on terror, " increasingly impact substantive areas that have been historically 
considered solely domestic. This Article normatively assesses and ultimately 
rejects established and recent scholarly approaches to treaty-interpretation 
deference. For nearly half a century, courts have relied on a demonstratively 
unprincipled and impracticable doctrine of giving executive interpretations 
"great weight. " Contemporary scholarly attempts to formulate more disciplined 
approaches to deference have applied the administrative law doctrine of 
Chevron-style deference and its two-step inquiry of "ambiguity" and 
"reasonableness, " resulting in the theoretical and doctrinal triumph of a system 
of ''.fzxed-point" deference. This Article argues that the particularities of treaty 
formation and enforcement, especially their hybrid political-legal features, 
demand a more flexible account of deference than has been delineated thus far. 
The currently in vogue fixed-point theories of deference should cede to a system 
that produces variable deference levels while maximizing each Branch's 
institutional strengths. 
20081 Rethinking Treaty Interpretation 779 
I. Introduction 
How should the Judiciary structure its reasoning in determining 
appropriate deference to executive-branch treaty interpretations? This is a 
crucial question for the rule of law in U.S. foreign relations, for constitutional 
law, and for the creation of a calibrated approach to gauging and balancing 
principles of separation of powers. 
The current doctrine is obtuse. The guiding principle is that the 
Judiciary should give "great weight" to views of the Executive. No one 
knows what this standard means, and the Judiciary has expended little effort 
in clarifying its position. Academic commentary is varied and ultimately 
unhelpful; some commentators argue that the standard means nothing while 
others argue that it provides dispositive effect. Neither view provides a com­
pelling justification for any reasoning underlying the standard's vagueness or 
erratic application. 
Devising a principled system of deference can be broadly contemplated 
as a choice among three options: absolute deference, no deference, or a co­
herent system operating somewhere between these two extremes. The 
systems of deference operating at the extremes, no deference and total 
deference, are both unfeasible and constitutionally suspect. In between these 
two extremes is the search for a principled standard of deference that har­
nesses the institutional virtues of all governmental branches and 
correspondingly minimizes their institutional weaknesses. There are two 
leading candidates for such a system: Chevron 1-style deference and 
Skidmore2 -style deference. Recent academic theory in foreign affairs greatly 
favors Chevron-style deference while dismissing Skidmore as Chevron's an­
tiquated predecessor. Ultimately, adopting Chevron-style deference would 
fail to solve many of the problems of the current doctrine while giving rise to 
new headaches. Chevron-style deference is too deferential in some cases and 
insufficiently deferential in others. It operates on an artificial plane that is 
not theoretically cogent in treaty interpretation and does not account for the 
peculiarities of treaty law that may compromise its effectiveness. 
Skidmore-style deference enables application of a flexible scale of 
deference that is more appropriate to the particularities of treaty law and the 
institutional balance that must be struck in a thicket of constitutional 
questions. A Skidmore-style account of deference would assess: ( 1) whether 
the treaty regulates executive power; (2) the type of international agreement 
being interpreted; (3) whether the Executive possesses relevant expertise; and 
(4) the process of enforcement and consistency (or inconsistency) of the 
Executive's position. 
The aim of this Article is to examine the doctrinal difficulties present in 
contemporary treaty interpretation and articulate a theory of a principled 
1. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
2. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
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form of deference, inspired by the factors described in Skidmore, that ad­
dresses the characteristics of treaties and balances principles of separation of 
powers and executive discretion. The argument unfolds as follows. Part I 
highlights the urgent need for a coherent and cogent system of treaty­
interpretation development demonstrated by U.S. policy in the "war on 
terror," as well as the expanding realm of regulation through international 
instruments. Part II discusses the infirmities present in the current doctrine 
of great weight deference and examines the historical and constitutional 
foundation of the doctrine. Part III provides a norrnati ve assessment of vari­
ous proposed models and argues that a more flexible form of deference 
inspired by the factors outlined in Skidmore and its progeny in the adminis­
trative law context represents a theoretically sound choice that addresses the 
latent concerns animating the failure of great weight deference while pro­
viding a structured form of deference well suited for application in treaty 
interpretation. 
II. The Importance of the Deference Question 
The question of the extent to which the Judiciary should defer to 
executive interpretations in discerning the meaning of treaties has largely 
been overlooked in favor of a broader assessment of the role of deference in 
foreign affairs generally.3 As a result there has been scant academic attention 
and divergent judicial application of treaty law, an area of law that has grown 
increasingly important and pervasive over the past fifty years. 
The meaning of law is inextricably tied to its interpretation. At its core, 
deference is the ceding of one power in favor of another. As many scholars 
have noted, in the twentieth century courts have granted more deference to 
executive pronouncements in foreign affairs than ever before.4 Such in­
creased deference is appropriate in some cases but inappropriate in others. 
3. See generally LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
132 .(2d ed. 1996) (highlighting the deference courts give to the statutory interpretations of the political branches of government when evaluating matters of foreign affairs); Curtis A. Bradley, 
Chevron Deference and f!oreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 650 (2000) (noting that courts have 
generally employed varymg degrees of deference to the Executive Branch regarding foreign-affairs 
matters . m order to avmd the un.comfortable choice of either applying the law to limit the mtematwnal p�wer of the �xecuttve Branch or abdicating their judicial function); Jonathan I. 
Charney, Jud1c1�l Deference 1� Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. lNT'L L. 805, 805 (1989) (outlining the 
spectrum of JUdicial prerogatives when deciding matters regarding foreign affairs, from deferring 
co�pletely to the Execul!ve Branch's position to disregarding the position of the Executive 
entirely). 
4. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 u.
.
cow. L. REv. 1439, 1442-45 (1999) (discussing the increase in judicial deference during the twentieth century)· Robert M Ches D. · 
. 
• · ney, 1saggregatmg Deference: The Judicial Power and Execut1ve Treaty Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1723, 1741-52 (2007) (outlining the development of the U.S .
. supreme Court's deference doctrine); G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constztutzonal Regime of Foreign Relations 85 y A L REv 1 3 (1999) (documentmg the "tnumph of ' ( d. · , · ' · · . .  · ' · 
I . ") 
execu Ive Iscretwn m the consl!tutJonal regime of foretgn re atwns . 
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To date, the Judiciary has failed to provide any clarity in its doctrine for dis­
cerning between the two. 5 
�s the U.S. population and its government have grown and policy 
questiOns have become more complex and persistent, law has not become 
clearer. The interpretation of all types of laws and the behaviors they permit 
and prohibit dictates who is punished, who is granted relief, and how indi­
viduals and institutions must behave. 
A. The Prol({eration a_{ Treaties in the Domestic Sphere 
The importance of treaty interpretation has been brought to the fore due 
to the increasingly globally integrated nature of politics, economics, and 
governance, as demonstrated by the proliferation of treaties,6 as well as the 
content of U.S. policy in the ongoing "war on terror." 
The latter half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty­
first have demonstrated remarkable growth in international connectedness, 
particularly on political and economic fronts. The result has been a dramatic 
proliferation of international treaties, both bilateral and multilateral, 
purporting to govern such diverse subject matters as state practice in warfare 
(e.g., the Geneva Conventions), taxation (typically bilateral treaties), 
government corruption (e.g., the Convention Against Corruption), civil and 
political rights (e.g., the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights), criminal prosecution and civil litigation cooperation (e.g., the 
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties), and many others.7 
As the substantive field covered by treaties grows, the importance of 
treaties as instruments of domestic law is enhanced. Concurrently, the 
Executive Branch has gathered increasing power both domestically and 
intemationally .8 At the time the Supreme Court decided Missouri v. 
Holland,9 holding that the federal government may regulate behavior it 
otherwise could not under the Tenth Amendment, 10 the idea of the federal 
5. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1733 ("There is no question that a deference doctrin� of some 
kind currently exists with respect to executive-branch treaty interpretations. But the precise nature 
of that doctrine, its triggering conditions, and the obligations it imposes on judges are far from 
clear."). 
6. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON NOVEMBER 1, 2007 (2007), 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/treaties/83046.pdf (listing over 10,000 treaties and 
executive agreements as "in force" within U.S. law). 
7. See generally, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4,. U.N. 
GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003); International Covenant on CIVll and 
Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368. .. 
8. See generally ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, at xv, xv-xvu, 
420-21 (First Mariner Books ed. 2004) (observing a long-term trend toward greater e�ecutJve 
control over "the war-making power, the power of the purse, and the power of oversight and 
mvestigation"). 
9. 252U.S.416(1920). 
10. !d. at 435. 
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government regulating purely domestic behavior through an internation�l 
treaty must have seemed an absurd possibility. The same cannot be said 
today. 
Public debate regarding U.S. policy following the terrorist attacks of 
9/11 has focused on the propriety of detaining terrorist suspects without trial, 
appropriate methods of interrogation, standards in targeting and . methods. 
of 
warfare, and the use of military commissions. All of these subjects are In­
strumental aspects of international humanitarian law and, in particular, the 
Geneva Conventions, a treaty to which the United States has been a signatory 
II for over fifty years. 
B. The US. "War on Terror" 
One of the essential questions since the beginning of the "war on terror" 
has been the extent to which U.S. treaties, especially the Geneva 
Conventions, have influenced, restricted, and governed federal action in 
pursuing terrorist suspects. The answer to this question largely begins with a 
determination of which branch of government may act as the arbiter of the 
meaning of treaties. Addressing the question of who interprets treaties nec­
essarily affects other major questions of treaty enforcement, such as their role 
in domestic law and the self-executing or non-self-executing nature of indi­
vidual treaties. Treaties possess an additional layer of politics not present in 
statutes: the relationship of the United States, as a singular nation, with for­
eign states and their citizens. 12 This imbues treaty interpretation with the 
sensitive political machinations of diplomatic policy and an aura that ac­
countability to other foreign states and citizens as parties is lessened through 
the very nature of their outsider status. 
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,13 the 
preeminent case thus far in the post-9111 world, is saturated with concern 
over the role of courts as the final arbiters of the meaning of treaties. 
However, Hamdan's conclusion poses more questions than it resolves. 
1. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.-Hamdan v. Rumsfeld concerned an appeal to 
the Supreme Court from an individual being detained as an alleged enemy 
combatant at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.14 Hamdan 
was a Yemeni national accused of acting against the law of war, designated 
for commission in accordance with a November 13 2001 Executive Order . 
. 
, 
that authonzed the prosecutwn of laws of war in the "war on terror" through 
11. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pnsoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
12. See John Yoo, Politic� as Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty lnte1pretatwn 89 CAL L REv 8 51 862 (2001) (b k · ) ( 1 · · th t . . . . ' · 
· 
· 
, oo review exp ammg a treaties have reciprocal mtemattonal and legal obligations). 
13. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
14. !d. at 2761. 
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the creation of military commissions. 15 The specific purpose of the 
commissions was to provide a venue for the trial of individuals associated 
with al Qaeda or otherwise engaged in terrorist activities. 16 Hamdan, like 
many other detainees at the base, filed a writ of habeas corpus challenging 
his detention and the procedures of the military commissions established by 
the President and promulgated through regulations by the Department of 
Defense. 17 This habeas challenge, like that of nearly all habeas challenges 
emanating from Guantanamo Bay, included a series of claims under the 
Geneva Conventions.18 One claim in particular was that Hamdan's detention 
was in violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions which , 
provides: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character 
occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each 
Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum . . .  the 
passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without 
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, 
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as 
indispensable by civilized peoples. 19 
Prior to Hamdan's habeas challenge, the President issued a 
memorandum finding that individuals detained as affiliated with al Qaeda or 
the Taliban were not entitled to protections under the Geneva Conventions/0 
a cornerstone of international humanitarian law.21 The memorandum was 
specifically applied to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The 
President stated, "[C]ommon Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either al 
Qaeda or Taliban detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant con­
flicts are international in scope . . .  .'m 
15. !d. at 2759. 
16. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Tre atment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
17. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2 759. 
18. /d. at 2762. 
19. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 11, art. 3, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. The Article is a "common" article as it is present in all four of the 
Geneva Conventions. See id.; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, supra note 11, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at 
Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces and in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. 
20. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President et al. (Feb. 7, 2002), in 
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 134-35 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. 
Orate! eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS]. 
21. See Susan L. Turley, Note, Keeping the Peace: Do the Laws of War Apply?, 73 TEXAS L. 
REV. 139, 141 (1994) ("[ T]he 1949 Geneva Conventions are the most well known and oft-quoted of 
the laws of war .... "). 
22. Memorandum from President George W. Bush to the Vice President et al., supra note 20, at 
134-35. 
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In support of the President's memorandum finding that the Geneva 
Conventions did not cover al Qaeda and Taliban members, the Executive 
asserted that the conflict in Afghanistan was "international [in] character" 
and, as such, not encompassed by Common Article 3.21 This view was 
consistent with an explanation of the coverage of Common Article 3 
provided by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) to the President shortly fol­
lowing September 11 th.24 In a memorandum from OLC to the President and 
the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, OLC implies that 
Common Article 3 's application to "armed conflict not of an international 
character" could be summarized geographically to mean "a war that does not 
involve cross border attacks."25 The memorandum continues: 
Common Article 3 's text provides substantial reason to think that it 
refers specifically to a condition of civil war, or a large-scale armed 
conflict between a State and an armed movement within its own 
territory. First, the text of the provision refers specifically to an armed 
conflict that a) is not of an international character, and b) occurs in the 
territory of a state party to the Convention. It does not sweep in all 
armed conflicts, nor does it address a gap left by common Article 2 for 
international armed conflicts that involve non-State entities (such as 
an international terrorist organization) as parties to the conflict. 
Further, common Article 3 addresses only non-international conflicts 
that �
6
ccur within the territory of a single state party, again, like a civil 
war. 
Discerning the meaning and coverage of Common Article 3 played a 
central role in the Hamdan decision at the trial court and in subsequent 
appeals. The U.S. District Court ruled on the Geneva Conventions question 
in favor of Hamdan, explicitly holding that the Conventions bequeathed indi­
vidual rights and that such rights precluded Hamdan's trial in front of the 
military commissions constructed under the President's order.27 The D.C. 
Circuit reversed, holding squarely that the Third Geneva Convention (upon 
which Hamdan relied) "does not confer upon Hamdan a right to enforce its 
provisions in court."28 In making this determination, the D.C. Circuit cited 
23. !d. at 135, 134-35 (quoting Common Article 3); see sources cited supra note I 9. 
24. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the D�p 't 
of Def. (Jan. 22, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 20, at 81, 90 (explaining that the 
conflict with a! Qaeda is of "an intemation
_
al character" because '
_
'AI Qaeda operates in many 
countries and earned out a masstve mtemattonal attack on the Umted States on September 11 
2001"). 
, 
25. !d. at 86. 
26. !d. 
27. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 160-62 (D.D.C. 2004), rev'd, 415 F.3d 33 
(D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). 
28. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2749. 
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the proposition that the interpretation of the Executive in the "construction 
and application of treaty provisions is entitled to 'great weight. "'29 
By the time Hamdan reached the Supreme Court, the implications of the 
Court's decision were enormous. The Supreme Court faced an objectively 
reasonable construction of a treaty in wartime. The Court's determination of 
the coverage of that treaty could impact U.S. wartime policy dramatically. 
On June 29. 2006. the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit's 
decision and held that the President did not possess the requisite authority to 
create a military-commission structure as had been constructed.30 The Court 
based this holding, in large part, on an interpretation of Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions directly in conflict with the Executive's proffered 
view.31 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, wrote flatly that the 
government's reasoning that underpinned its interpretation of the 
"international character" of the conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban was 
"erroneous."32 Instead, the majority held that the application to a conflict 
"not of an international character" refers to a conflict between a state and a 
nonstate entity.33 The great weight standard relied upon by the D.C. Circuit 
as a central aspect of its decision is nowhere to be found. 
The absence of the standard was not lost on the dissent. Justice 
Thomas, in a dissent joined in part by Justices Alito and Scalia, argued that 
"the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies 
charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight."34 
Justice Thomas continued: 
[T]he Court, without acknowledging its duty to defer to the President, 
adopts its own, admittedly plausible, reading of Common Article 3. 
But where, as here, an ambiguous treaty provision ("not of an 
international character") is susceptible of two plausible, and 
reasonable, interpretations, our precedents require us to defer to the 
Executive's interpretation?5 
29. Id. at 41 (quoting United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989)). 
30. Hamdan v. Rwnsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2763 (2006). 
31. See id. at 2796 ("Common Article 3, then, is applicable here and, as indicated above, 
requires that Hamdan be tried by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees 
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
32. Id. at 2795. 
33. See id. at 2796 ("Common Article 3, by contrast, affords some minimal protection, falling 
short of full protection under the Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory nor 
even a nonsignatory 'Power' who are involved in a conflict 'in the territory of a signatory. The 
latter kind of conflict is distinguishable from the conflict described in Common Article 2 chiefly 
because it does not involve a clash between nations (whether signatories or not)."). 
34. Jd. at 2846 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Stuart, 489 U.S. at 369 and Sumitomo Shoji 
Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)). 
35. Jd. The dissent then concluded that, even if applicable, Common Article 3 is already 
satisfied under the President's military order and accompanying regulations. See id. at 2847 ("In 
any event, Hamdan's military commission complies with the requirements of Common Article 3. It 
is plainly 'regularly constituted' because such commissions have been employed throughout our 
history to try unlawful combatants for crimes against the law of war."). 
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In the view of the dissent, the case for deference was particularly strong 
in this case where the Executive was "acting pursuant to his constitutional 
authority as Commander in Chief . ... "30 In other words, the pull of great 
weight deference to judicial acquiescence should be heightened in the con­
text of war. 
2. The Military Commissions Act.-The lesson of Hamdan is 
incomplete without discussion of the statutory regime it wrought, the 
Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006.n While the majority opinion 
invalidated the President's system of military commissions, Justice Breyer's 
concurrence noted that "[n]othing prevents the President from returning to 
Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary."1x 
The President requested and received explicit congressional 
authorization for a military-commission system for trying alleged enemy 
combatants for crimes against the law of war through the MCA. 39 
In addition to creating the infrastructure for a new program of military 
commissions and amending the habeas jurisdiction available to detainees, the 
MCA addresses the Geneva Convention interpretive issue by directly dele­
gating to the President the power "to interpret the meaning and application of 
the Geneva Conventions."40 
The President utilized this power explicitly in a new executive order 
outlining his interpretation of Common Article 3 as it relates to the ongoing 
detention and interrogation of individuals by the Central Intelligence 
Agency.41 
III. The Current Doctrine Is Insufficient 
The current judicial doctrine of deference to executive treaty 
interpretations is entirely unhelpful. The standard, originally articulated by 
Justice Black in Kolovrat v. Oregon, 42 is that while "courts interpret treaties 
for themselves," it is important that "the meaning given [to treaties] by the 
departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and 
36. /d. 
37. Military Commissions Act of2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (to be codified in 
scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
38. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
39. See Military Commissions Act § 3(a)(1) (establishing procedures governing the use of 
military commissions to try alien unlawful enemy combatants violating the law of war and engaging 
in hostilities against the United States). 
40. /d. § 6(a)(3)(A). But see 152 CONG. REC. S10,399 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2006) (statement of 
Sen. McCain, with which Sen. Warner concurred) (arguing that with reference to the President's 
authority to engage in grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, "Nothing in this bill gives the 
President the authority to modify the conventions or our obligations under those treaties"). 
41. See Exec. Order No. 13,440,72 Fed. Reg. 40,707 (July 20, 2007). 
42. 366 U.S. 187 (1961). 
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enforcement is given great weight.''43 The intrinsic tension present in the 
preeminent case creating the modem judicial doctrine of treaty-interpretation 
deference has only been heightened by subsequent judicial practice. 
Courts have often stated that the views of the Executive Branch on the 
meaning of a treaty in question arc "not conclusive."44 The empirical data on 
the matter show otherwise. In his study of Supreme Court treaty­
interpretation cases between 1986 and 1999, Professor David Bederman 
concluded that of the twelve cases the Court faced, "in all but one the holding 
followed the express wishes of the executive branch of the govemment."45 
One commentator has suggested that the question of the degree of deference 
to the Executive in interpreting (and thus enforcing) treaties is dependent on 
"who is accused of being the party in breach and the perceived competence 
of the judiciary to offer a remedy. "46 
A. The Doctrine of Treaty Interpretation at the Founding: Little Deference 
Is the great weight standard derived from any generally understood 
conception of constitutional intent or meaning? Neither the constitutional 
text nor early case law indicates any such derivation.47 There is remarkably 
little text in the Constitution detailing the division of powers between the 
Branches in foreign affairs. Article II governs the creation of treaties through 
submission by the Executive and supermajority ratification by the Senate.48 
Article VI, the Supremacy Clause, establishes treaties as the "supreme Law 
of the Land" alongside the Constitution and the laws of the United States.49 
Article III provides U.S. domestic courts with jurisdiction over their 
adjudication. 50 
43. /d. at l 94. 
44. United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., v. 
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)). 
45. Bederman, supra note 4, at 1465 (emphasis omitted). 
46. Tim Wu, Treaties' Domains, 93 VA. L. REv. 571, 573 (2007). 
47. Professors Sloss and Yoo offer conflicting views of the originalist view of treaty­
interpretation deference. Compare David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty 
Interpretations: A Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 506-07 (2007) 
(surveying judicial decisions of treaty construction in the first fifty years of the Supreme Court and 
concluding that the Court at this time period utilized a no-deference standard toward executive 
interpretations of treaties), with John C. Yoo, Rejoinder: Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens 
of Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1305 (2002) (using, inter alia, a textual and structural analysis of 
the Vesting Clause to support the proposition that an originalist understanding of the Foreign 
Affairs power would place the task of treaty interpretation within the Executive Branch rather than 
the Judiciary). 
48. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur ... . "). 
49. See id. art. VI ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made 
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... "). 
50. See id. art. III, § 2, cl. l ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be 
made, under their Authority .... "). 
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The Federalist Papers also offer little: guidance in unearthing a precise 
division of power over the function and execution of treaties as supreme fed­
eral law. In Ft!deralist No. :n. Alexander Hamilton asserts. "The treaties of 
the United States. to have any ton:e at all. must be considered as part of the 
law of the land. Their true import. as f�tr as respects individuals. must, like 
all other laws. be ascertained by judicial dctcm1inations."�1 Hamilton also 
suggested, ''The power in question [the treaty power] seems ... to form a 
distinct department, and to belong . properly. neither to the legislative nor to 
the executive. "52 Rather. instead of treat ies representing an enactment of 
new laws, the objects of treaties : 
are CONTRACTS with foreign nations which have the force of law, 
but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They are not rules 
prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between 
sovereign and sovereign. . . . The qualities elsewhere detailed as 
indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations point out the 
executive as the most fit agent in those transactions . . . . �u 
The early American Supreme Court did not appear to possess the 
theoretical conflict typified by contemporary academia and courts. On the 
one hand, the Court's famous decision in Marbury v. Madison54 also pro­
vided a basis for broad discretion to the Executive in foreign affairs by 
noting: 
[T]he President is invested with certain important political powers, in 
the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is 
accountable only to his country in his political character, and to his 
own conscience. . . . The acts of ... an officer [appointed by the 
President], as an officer, can never be examinable by the courts. 55 
One might think that the making of treaty interpretations within the context 
of the exercise of presidential powers in foreign affairs, and national security 
in particular, might be exactly the type of "political powers" that would re­
quire great deference or even abstention. However, other cases decided by 
the Supreme Court soon after the Founding indicate that the Court granted 
the Executive little to no deference in matters of treaty interpretation. 56 Dur­
ing the first fifty years of the Republic, the Court faced nineteen cases in 
which the U.S. government was a party and proffered an interpretation of a 
treaty. The government's proffered interpretation was accepted in only three 
of those cases.57 
51. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 51, at 451. 
53. Id. at 450-51. 
54. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
55. !d. at 165-66. 
56. See Sloss, supra note 47, at 506-{)8, 506 & n.59 (listing and discussing early cases decided 
by the Supreme Court). 
57. !d. 
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The reasoning behind the early American Court's decisions betrays a 
view of the interpretation of treaties as a conclusively judicial function. The 
Amiable Isabella, 58 a case concerning a Spanish ship captured during the War 
of 1812, presented a government interpretation of a treaty between the 
United States and Spain.59 The government argued that the ship was not im­
mune from capture.60 This position led to substantial commentary in the 
majority and the dissent. Justice Story wrote that the core of the controversy 
was "the interpretation of a treaty which we are bound to observe with the 
most scrupulous good faith, and which our Government could not violate 
without disgrace, and which this Court could not disregard without betraying 
its duty. "61 The dissent concurred in this aspect of the judgment, finding that 
"the views of the administration ... are wholly out of the question in this 
Court" and that it was of no matter "whether [the Court's interpretation of the 
treaty] chime[s] in with the views of the Government or not."62 
Founding Era courts did not provide deference to the Executive even in 
questions directly implicating national security issues. In United States v. 
Laverty, 63 the United States had detained individuals believed to be enemy 
aliens in Louisiana. 64 The treaty question at issue was whether the admission 
of Louisiana as a state implicitly granted citizenship to those residing in the 
territory prior to statehood.65 In determining the answer to this question, the 
court referred to the treaty with France that provided the United States with 
the Louisiana Territory.66 The government argued that the indigenous people 
of Louisiana (Creoles) were not citizens due to noncompliance with other 
citizenship regulations.67 The majority decision in the case reviewed the 
treaty, which required admission of the native people "as soon as possible" as 
citizens, and found that a contrary reading would render the United States in 
violation of the treaty.68 The finding implicitly rejected the government's 
preferred reading of the text. 
B. Treaty Interpretation in the Contemporary Court: Near-Total Deference 
If not originalism, what explains the move from the extraordinarily 
limited deference of treaty interpretation during the nation's infancy to the 
great weight deference practices subsequent to the Kolovrat decision in 
58. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) I (1821). 
59. !d. at 6. 
60. !d. at 14. 
61. !d. at 68. 
62. !d. at 92 (Johnson, J., dissenting). 
63. 26 F. Cas. 875 (D. La. 1812) (No. 15569A). 
64. !d. at 875. 
65. !d. at 876. 
66. See id. (discussing the Treaty for the Cession of Louisiana, U.S.-Fr., Apr. 30, 1803, 8 S
tat. 
200). 
67. !d. at 876-77. 
68. !d. at 876, 876-77 .  
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1 96 1 '? The i mpl ic i t  j ust i ficat ion appl!ars inst i tut ional in origin. girded by the 
belief that institutiona l benefi ts  o f  t he E.xl!cut ivc in executing treaties out­
weigh any advantages of and wou l d  t hus he countermanded by, judicial 
interference in the a b i l i ty of the federal government to act swiftly and "speak 
in 'one voice "' in foreign amti rs.1''l 
The case law of t reaty- in terpretat ion deference fo l lowing Kolovrat 
sheds little l ight on a structu red app l icat ion of the great weight standard. 
Empirical ly, courts invoking the standard have rout inely acquiesced to the 
interpretation advocated by the Execut i ve. 'o In this  sense. the great weight 
standard has portended. if not ana lytically justified. a victory for the execu­
tive view, despite judicial insistence that  it maintai ns an independent role. 
The background of this determination seems to indicate several possible ra­
tionales for this recent deference: ( I )  a concern over judicial competence in 
matters of foreign affairs; (2) the enormous value placed in the ability of the 
Executive to be flexible in foreign affairs; 7 1  and ( 3 )  the increasing consolida­
tion of power into the Executi ve Branch and away from both the Legislative 
and Judicial Branches. 72 
The emphasis on the role of the Executive in foreign affairs has not 
rendered the great weight doctrine any clearer. In the twenty-odd years 
following the decision in Kolovrat, the Court would assess the Executive 's 
interpretation within the framework of its previous pronouncements on the 
subject, as well as for i ts consistency with the plain meaning of the text. The 
twin principles in tension in Kolovrat-the judicial power to construe treaties  
set against the great weight given to executive determinations-slipped dra­
matically to favor the Executive in the latter part of the twentieth century.73 
69. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
1170, 1202 (2007);  see id. (reviewing courts' reasons for giving deference to the Executive in 
foreign-relations cases and concluding that "the underlying justifications are often Jess textual than 
functional, based on traditional practices and understandings" of institutional competency) .  
70.  Professor Robert Chesney has conducted an extensive study of cases demonstrating the 
sometimes inconsistent, but often highly deferential, appli cation of great weight deference by the 
courts. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1775 (listing cases from 1984 through 2005 in which courts 
en�aged the deference doctrine an� i�dicating .a high fre.quency of cases invoking great weight in which the court adopted the Executive s treaty mterpretatwn) . However, the decision of whether or 
not to invoke the standard itself may be less of an analytic exercise than results justification. Courts 
facing treaty-interpretation questions that do not invoke the great weight standard are far more 
likely to interpret a treaty contrary to the Executive's position. See. e.g. , Hamdan v.  Rumsfeld 126 
S. Ct. 2749, 2795-97 (2006) (holding that, contrary to the Executive's assertions, Common Miele 
3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to an alien captured in connection with the United States' 
conflict with a! Qaeda). 
71. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 69, at 1 202. 
72. John S. Baker, Jr., Competing Paradigms of Constitutional Power in "The War on 
Terrorism, " 1 9  NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 5, 5-6 (2005). 
73. Such substantive limitations were fatally compromised following the Court's d ecision in 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 ( 1 992). In Alvarez-Machain, a defendant abducted 
from Mexico and brought to the United States to face criminal charges asserted that the U.S. action 
was in violation of the U.S. extradition treaty with Mexico, which did not authorize removals absent 
Mexico's consent. Jd. at 657-58. For another example of great weight treaty interpretation by the 
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In addition to the large number of cases in which the Court actually 
grants deference to executive interpretations, the Court's  nominal forays into 
explaining the great weight standard have tended toward extreme deference. 
The Court 's decision in Sumitomo Sh(�ji A m erica, Inc. v. Avagliano74 demon­
strated the Court ' s  will ingness to defer to an executive-branch interpretation 
even in the face of inconsistent interpretive practices within the Executive.75 
The Court similarly proc laimed the importance of great weight deference 
even in circumstances where the treaty text at issue was not considered 
ambiguous.76 
Under cases like Swn itomo and Stuart, the Court's doctrine seemed to 
establish the concept that great weight, in its most simplistic form, meant that 
the executive interpretation triumphs.  This simplicity was undermined by 
subsequent cases ignoring77-and then undermining78-the great weight 
standard as dependent upon the reasonableness of the Executive 's 
interpretation. 
C. The Conundrum of Doctrine Without Theory 
The development of the case law over the l ast fifty years indicates that 
the driving force behind the Court's inconsistent approach to deference in 
treaty interpretation is  based on institutional concerns rather than any devel­
oped theory. In essence, the Court engages in its own interpretive method 
when ( 1 )  the question presented is amenable to textual construction and (2) 
the contemplated effects o f  a decision contrary to the Executive's interpreta­
tion would not be serious. 
When the C ourt b e lieves that it is well equipped to settle a properly 
presented question of textual construction, it engages in interpretation alone. 
When enough concerns arise about the potential foreign effects of an inter­
pretive decision, it defers .79 
Rehnquist Court, see Jte/ Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 ( 1 993), which 
rejected the petitioner's challenge to the Executive's proffered treaty interpretation as inconsistent 
with earlier practice. 
74. 457 U.S. 1 76 ( 1 982).  
75 . See id. at 1 84 n. l O, 1 84-85 (demonstrating the Court's deference to the State Department's 
treaty interpretation even though it was initially "ambiguous"). 
76. See United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 366-70 ( 1989) (relying on an Internal Revenue 
Service interpretation of a treaty despite previously finding that the meaning of the treaty was plain 
on its face). 
77. See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 133, 133-3 5  (1989) (rejecting the 
Executive's argument that a "drafting error" accounted for a discrepancy between the correct 
interpretation of a treaty and its clear text). . 
78. See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsu1 Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 1 55, 168 (1999) ("Respect is 
ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an 
international treaty."). 
79. See Wu, supra note 46, at 573 (m�g a descriptive claim that judicial enforcement of 
treaties "turns mairlly on who is accused of bemg the party in breach and the perceived competence 
of the judiciary to offer a remedy"). 
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Th is tension is consistent with the conceptual di fficulty posed by 
treat ies as both pol i t ical and k·gal instruments. Courts are institutionally 
designed for t he practical application o f  legal norms bur i l l  suited to balanc­
ing political i n terests, espec ial ly when those po l it ical interests are foreign
.
in 
nature. Treat ies, i ntrinsica l ly both po l i t it·a l and legal, thus pose a spectal 
chal lenge to courts in disentangling those competing threads. 
Judicial deference in foreign a mtirs outside the treaty context is infused 
with the hes itance to impact f(>re ign a mt i rs .  This hesitance has manifested 
itself in the creat ion of a variety of nonjust iciabi l ity and abstention 
doctrines.lw 
Nonjusticiabi l i ty and abstention doctrines have been controversial as 
acts of judicial modesty.H 1  Justice Douglas criticized excessive deference to 
the Executive as rendering the Judiciary "a mere errand boy for the 
Executive Branch which may choose to pick some people's chestnuts from 
the fire, but not others ' .  "82 Ironically, the indeterminate nature of the Court's 
deference doctrines has turned the current critique into one in which the 
Judiciary, rather than the Executive, makes the final decision as to each 
petitioner's "chestnuts. "83 
Whatever the motive, case law throughout all divisions of the Judiciary 
demonstrates quite convincingly that judges genuinely struggle with a con­
cern that foreign-affairs questions, particularly treaty questions, are 
"different" from other law. 84 Advocates of broad deference to the political 
branches in foreign affairs generally, and treaties in particular, have empha­
sized this concern in their writings. 85 
80. Among these are the act-of-state doctrine and the political-question doctrine (largely dead 
within the context of domestic affairs). 
8 1 .  See Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. 
CoLO. L. REv. 1395, 1 396 (1999) (arguing that courts are not qualified to engage in assessing the 
effects of judgments on foreign affairs). 
82. First Nat'! City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773 (1 972) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
83. See Goldsmith, supra note 8 1 ,  at 1422 (characterizing this justification as indicative of the 
"lawlessness" of the foreign-relations-effects test, whether applied by the Executive or the 
Judiciary). 
84. See, e.g. , Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 1 03, I l l  ( 1 948) 
("[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. . . . They are 
delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. . . . They are decisions of a kind for 
which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility . . . .  "); Att'y Gen. o f  Can. v. 
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 1 14 (2d Cir. 2001)  ("When a foreign nation 
appears as a plaintiff in our courts seeking enforcement of its revenue laws, the judiciary risks being 
drawn into issues and disputes of foreign relations policy that are assigned to--and better handled 
by-the political branches of government."). 
85. See Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New 
Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 ,  130-34 (2000) (discussing the argwnents 
against an active judicial role in foreign affairs, particularly that courts are institutionally 
incompetent in such matters and that sufficient political safeguards already ex
.
ist);
_ 
Yoo, supra note 
47, at 1315 (arguing that considering the treaty power as another type of leg1slattve power would 
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The inverse of c oncern over judicial inc ompetence is a high valuation of 
the institutional capacity of the Executive Branch to act swiftly in times of 
crisis and alter foreign-affairs practice in response to changing 
circumstances. This value is typically encompassed in praise of retaining the 
Executive's "flexibil ity" in foreign affairs.xo 
Executive flexibility, however, is not an exclusive goal, even in times of 
war or national emergency. It is one value among many institutional values 
enshrined in the Constitution. A c oherent separation-of-powers system re­
quires recognizing and optimizing institutional powers to determine and 
provide meaning to the role and interpretation of treaties in U.S. law. 
IV. Creating a Theory of Operation 
There are three basic approaches to providing structure to the judicial 
doctrine of deference: no deference, total deference, or an intermediate 
standard. Each of these approaches is l imited in elasticity. Total- and no­
deference approaches require all circumstances of treaty interpretation to fall 
within tightly bound limits. Chevron-style deference, a popular intermediate 
option, recognizes a limited need for elasticity in deference but translates 
imperfectly from the strictures of its administrative context, due to its genesis 
as an instrument of congressional delegation and the procedural requirements 
that accompany the logic of this genesis. 
Fundamentally, deference involves a willingness to acquiesce one's 
power in favor of another and an assessment of the wisdom of doing so. 
Wisely providing deference requires recognizing and balancing the particu­
larities of the genre in which deference is requested and the institutional 
advantages and concerns that may counsel the exercise of deference. 
The heightened academic concern of preserving executive flexibility 
may reflect current world events. Substantial executive discretion is of value 
in conducting foreign relations. However, the focus on this institutional 
value of the Executive should not obscure other institutional values inherent 
to the Judiciary that act to sharpen, and thus enhance, rule-of-law principles 
central to constitutional precepts of separation of powers. 
This Part provides a brief assessment of institutional values at stake in 
both the Executive and Judicial Branches and then examines the prominent 
proposals of deference along the spectrum, from total deference to no 
deference. Eliminating the options at the extremes, which are both legally 
suspect and likely to be inappropriate in most circumstances, this Part pro­
poses a new approach to ascertaining a middle ground in the context of treaty 
interpretation. 
contradict the Framers' understanding of the separation of powers between the Legislative and 
Executive Branches). 
86. See ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, 
LrBERTY, AND THE COURTS 161-81 (2007) (defending the judicial-deference approach against 
various alternative approaches regarding the President's exercise of emergency powers). 
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It examines two existing deference models-Chevron-style and 
Skidmore-style-and their applicability to treaty i�terpretation. Adapt�d 
from administrative law, Chevron-style deference IS the current academic 
darling; however, as this Part outlines, it is inflexi�le in �ssessing th� con­
cerns that animate excessive executive interference m the Implementation of 
treaties. As a result, while its exercise has been perverted into near-total 
deference, its application in foreign affairs suffers from both over- and 
underinclusiveness. In contrast, deference based on Skidmore, properly ar­
ticulated and converted to assess the particularities of treaties, offers a 
flexible model of deference most likely to balance competing interests and 
leverage the core competencies and institutional advantages of the Branches. 
A. Discerning Legal Thresholds and Institutional Values 
A prerequisite to determining the proper scope of deference is 
determining the line between legal dictates and institutional preferences. In 
circumstances where the Constitution so requires, deference may be neces­
sary even if a host of institutional values counsel for robust judicial inquiry. 
In that vein, deference to the Executive is at its strongest when the 
action or judgment at issue is within the exclusive power of the Executive to 
determine. In the treaty context, such a situation arises when a court is asked 
to determine whether a foreign nation remains part of a relevant treaty 
regime.87 Similarly, a court defers to the judgment of "international facts" 
that may be material to determining treaty content.88 Such concerns are 
considered exclusively within the province of the Executive as the political 
branch charged with execution of the foreign policy of the United States.89 
More controversially, deferring to an executive interpretation of a treaty 
may be judicially advisable even when not required by other law. Institu­
tional concerns impose themselves with greater frequency and urgency as the 
p�rely legal basis for deference becomes more ambiguous.90 It is in those 
Circumstances where assessing the institutional values of choosing to act or 
. 
87. See, e.g. , Then v. Melendez, 92 F.3d 8 5 1 ,  854 (9th Cir. 1996) (deferring to the 
i�terpretattons of the S�te Department in determining that a valid extradition treaty existed between 
Smgapore and the Umted States); see also Bradley, supra note 3, at 660 (explaining that the 
Sup�eme Court ha� accepted as legally binding the Executive Branch's decision on whether a 
foretgn natwn contmues to remain a party to a treaty). 
88. Bradley, supra
_ 
note 3,
_ 
at 66 1,  661-62; see also, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 ( 1984) (notmg foretgn mterest m economic sanctions targeting Cuba). 
89. See Bradley, supra n
_
ote 3, at 659-63 (discussing a variety of situations in which the courts generally defer to the Executive Branch in its handling of foreign affairs). 
90 .
. 
See, e.g. , �hesney, supra note 4, at 1 732 ("[T]here is considerable confusion with respect to the 
_
obhgahon to give
_ 
at least some deference to executive treaty interpretations"); Jide Nzelibe, The Umqueness of Fore1gn Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REv 94 1 975 (2004) (p · rive-institutionalism approach t I . th . . 
. ' . . . roposmg a compar
a . 
. 0 ana yzmg e pohtlcal-queshon doctrme m the context of foreign affatrs). 
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to defer is most crucial.9 1  I ssues of treaty interpretation are difficult precisely 
because they go beyond the threshold question of whether the case can be 
heard �nd
_ 
venture into the territory of how the treaty should be applied, as 
law, wtthm the courts. Examining the core competencies of each Branch 
including institutional structure and values, helps clarify how each Branch 
should function in the realm of treaty operation.92 
1 .  The Institutional Values and Deficiencies of Executive Action.­
Flexibility, accountability, and specialization are the core institutional values 
offered by the Executive in foreign affairs. 
a. Flexibiliry.-As a single branch with an unmistakable hierarchy 
leading to one person, the Executive possesses an inherent flexibility un­
matched by the other branches of government. The Judiciary, steeped in 
precedent and dependent upon the happenstance of cases and controversies, 
is unable to act expeditiously. To a similar end, the Legislature is 
multitudinous, slow, and comprised of various interests and backgrounds. 
Flexibility enables the Executive to act quickly in a time of emergency, to 
alter application or enforcement of legal agreements it executes, and to en­
gage in a number of other politically oriented actions to serve policy goals. 
b. Accountability.-The Executive Branch is democratically 
accountable. In addition to elections, the President is accountable to his 
political party and motivated by a quest for historical legacy. Further, the 
personnel that make up the Executive are typically individuals whose future 
is tied to the perceived success of the administration. This accountability 
makes the Executive more responsible to the voters for failures and sensitive, 
nuanced political assessments than the Judiciary. 
c. Specialization. -Finally, the Executive Branch is the primary 
governmental actor involved in both drafting and implementing treaty law. 
These actions naturally lead to a consolidation of legal an� pragmati� knowl­
edge as to the operation of international instruments.. 
T
_
h�s power IS . not by 
accident. As evidenced by federal ist writings and JUdicial c_
oncep�wns �f 
deference to the Executive Branch, the promulgation of treatle� , with their 
inherent international reach, is inextricably  part of the provmce of the . ff: . 93 Executive's prerogative to operate the federal foreign-a airs power. 
9 1 .  See generally Nzelibe �upra note 90, at 967-75 (systematically criticizing the ea
rly Court's 
c- · � • · h .. . t . alist" approach to the problem and 'ormaltst approach to the foreJgn-affatrs power, t e mterna wn . ' . 
�
he "liberalist" response to the internationalist approach, and advocatmg
 a comparative 
mstitutionalist analysis). . . 
· · · 1 d d · this Part are not exhaustive m nature 92. The institutional values and deficJenctes me u e m . . . but rather designed to highlight core institutional concerns and values present m d
etermu ng a 
system of deference. 
93. See supra notes 20--2 1 ,  85-89 and accompanying text. 
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The drafting role of the Executive creates an ini� ial and unli
.
mited .power of interpretation over treaty law. While the draftmg power IS subject to 
agreement with other parties, the Un�ted St�tes' pos�tion as
. 
world hegemon 
creates unequaled negotiating power m craftmg multi lateral mstruments and, 
of course, bilateral treaties. The execution o f  negotiating power and drafting 
decisions forms a crucial initial interpretation of the provisions being created. 
Drafting decisions include choosing broad and ambiguous terminology or 
precise language; choosing words between varying analogues; including or 
deleting differing provisions; and structuring the language to imply the envi­
sioned right or remedy contemplated. The choice between an individually 
possessed right and an explicitly diplomatically enforced remedy can be 
weighed and determined among the parties. 
At the conclusion of the drafting process, the Executive possesses the 
exclusive authority to determine whether the treaty it crafted will  proceed to 
ratification. During this stage, the Executive determines whether it will sign 
the treaty and whether it will present the treaty to the Senate for ratification.94 
The President then chooses whether he wants the instrument to take the 
form of an Article II treaty or prefers the flexibility of an executive 
agreement. 95 
Assuming the Senate ratifies the treaty, the Executive assumes the 
burden of executing the treaty obligations. Everyday compliance with U.S. 
treaty obligations occurs through the administration of the treaty by 
Executive bureaucracy. Other signatories will look to the Executive when 
they believe a breach has occurred and exert pressure to ensure compliance.96 
In short, the everyday decisions as to the meaning of U.S . treaty obligations 
fall, in the first instance, to the Executive bureaucracy. 
The role of treaty administration also implies correlative determinations 
�f ho:V the
. treaty will be executed and enforced internally. Such determ
ina­
tiOns �var�abl y  require the bureaucratic actors and their supervisors to make 
detenrunatt�n
.
s as to t�e relative importance of varying provisions and their 
own capabthty to Implement compliance policy effectively. These 
enfor�ement (and nonenforcement) decisions frame the development of 
meanmg of these provisions and the j udicial cases that flow from government 
action (or inaction). 
94. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 .  
95. Avoiding ratification procedur s b l  h p · · . . . e ena es t e resident to create International agreements With other nations With t�e m?st minimal interference of other branches of government. But see �hn K. �etea;,E 
The P:eszdent s Rational Choice of a Treaty 's Preratification Pathway: Article II, ongresswna - xecutzve Agreement, or Executive Agreement? 3 1  J LEGAL STUD SS S l2-16 (2002) (outlining h · · · · · · · '  · · ' . reasons w Y a ratwnal, unhty-maxumzmg President may desire to forego an executive agreement and attempt to · · ·th Arti 1 II . 
gam congressiOnal approval for ratification in confonnance WI c e requrrements). 
96. This burden is not limited to self f · · 
fact place a eat b d 
. -execu mg treaties. Non-self-executing treaties may, m 
Pas� legislati� i;
r
l ur 
e
tm� 
on the Executive as other signatories pressure the Executive to craft and p emen g provisiOns of such a treaty. 
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Conversely, the structure of the Executive also creates institutional 
shortcomings. Executive action is made under intense time pressures, with 
highly incomplete information and with motivations designed to maximize 
power and flexibility rather than adherence to law. Institutional values of the 
other branches check these shortcomings. Values of the Judiciary are of par­
ticular relevance to this Article. 
2. The Institutional Values and Deficiencies of Judicial Action.-The 
Judiciary offers quite different institutional values than the Executive. The 
disaggregatcd nature of the Judiciary results in diverse considered review 
that ultimately produces a long-term perspective on policy goals, promotes 
uniformity of decision, and enhances the overall legitimacy of law. 
a. Long-Term Perspective.-The fact that federal judicial 
appointees serve life terms, together with the basic judicial doctrine of stare 
decisis, encourages judges to consider the long-term effects and legal impli­
cations of their judgments through a much different lens than that of the 
short-term-focused political branches. While purely political actors are 
highly motivated relative to short-term political judgments, j udicial action 
tempers such short-term judgments through the political insulation of a life 
term and the obligation to justify future deviations from present judgments. 
b. Diversity.-The federal Judiciary consists of hundreds of  jurists 
chosen from presidential administrations spanning from present day to the 
Truman presidency. These judges carry with them substantially different 
life, intellectual, and legal experiences that influence their jurisprudence. 
The exchange of judicial opinions from various federal district and appellate 
courts plays an important role in the ultimate decisions of the Supreme Court. 
In addition to the natural-selection element of intellectual analysis each 
opinion may engender, the large span of experience represented in the 
Judiciary establishes continuity over time as executive administrations and 
legislative bodies revolve. 
c. Promoting Uniformity.-The judicial doctrine of stare decisis 
and judicial modesty typically lead to very few contenders in legal 
interpretations. Court decisions, while ultimately vulnerable to changing 
judicial opinion, are structurally and procedurally more enshrined than ex­
ecutive determinations that are easily discarded from administration to 
administration or, m certain political circumstances, within an 
administration. 97 
97. See generally RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, FOREIGN POLICY ROLES OF THE PRESIDENT AND 
CONGRESS ( 1999), http://fpc.state.gov/fpc/6 1 72.htm (discussing different methods by which the 
Executive and Congress affect foreign policy). 
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d. Legitimacy Enhancing.-As demonstrated by the Bush 
Administration' s  interpretation of the requirements of the Geneva 
Conventions, a unilateral executive interpretation of international obligations 
is often viewed as subjectively biased rather than objectively reached. In 
contrast, the diverse, politically insulated federal Judic iary fares much better 
in world opinion polls.98 Beyond basic popularity, the perception of an 
independent, structural check on executive power in foreign a ffairs assists in 
creating an aura of legitimacy surrounding the implementation of interna­
tional law. 
Conversely, the structural disaggregation and limited hierarchy of the 
Judiciary lead to divergent opinions, slow legal process, and a generalism 
that precludes routine and consistent experience-based application of spe­
cialized knowledge. Critics of judicial review of executive actions in foreign 
affairs argue, reasonably, that judicial action can act as a restraint on execu­
tive power that could otherwise be used to effectuate American policy 
goals.99 This is undoubtedly true and only makes the current doctrinal mo­
rass more disconcerting. 
These institutional characteristics of the Judiciary result in better, more­
transparent national policy making in foreign affairs. Some of these benefits 
have long been recognized as inherent benefits in the domestic realm. Their 
importance is not diminished in the context of the enforcement and interpre­
tation of U.S. treaty law. Instead, the procedural uniqueness of treaty law 
indicates a heightened importance in accruing the benefits bestowed by in­
stitutional exchange with the Judiciary. 
. 
Ultimately, the institutional value of ensuring executive flexibility is 
Important. However, it should not be inflated to the extent that it nullifies the 
institutional values enshrined in constitutional principles of separation of 
powers and inherent in meaningful judicial review of executive action. This 
is true even in  matters of national security. 
. .
The cha�l�nge of crafting a principled structure of treaty interpretation 
hes. m, com?�mng competing values of flexibi l ity of the Executive, as the 
�atiOn s pohtlcal act�r on the international stage, while effectuating the legal 
�ns� ments. 
that treaties represent within our constitutional structure through 
JUdicial review. 
98. See, e.g. , World Opinion Roundu http /fbi - 1 
2006/07/guantanam t' 
p, : og.washmgtonpost.com/worldopinionroundup 
o reac Ion seen as us html (J 1 26 
. -
reaction to the Supr�e Court ruli� i; 
· 
. 
u Y 
, 
2006, 1 2 :38 EST) (discussing positiVe 
also Joseph Carroll, Slim Ma ·ori o} A 
U�tted States v. Hamdan among world newspapers); see 
2007, http://www.gallup.c:m/p�IV287����;
� 
Appro_ve of the Supreme Court, GALLUP, Sept 26, 
(highlighting a national opinion oil ivin 
Maj onty-Amencans-Approve-Su�reme-Court.aspx 
with President Bush' s  36o; app 
p 
1 
g 
t' 
g the Supreme Court a 5 1 %  approval ratmg, as compared 
10 rova ra mg and c ' 24o; . 
99. See POSNER & VERME 
ongress s 10 approval ratmg).  
ULE, supra note 86 at  272 ("T b bl 
· 
· al 
crises, the president cannot be hemmed in b 
. 
' 
_ 
o e a e to r�spond to. m�emat1on 
interpreted by judges."). 
Y mtematwnal treaties and constitutiOnal hm!tatwns, as 
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B. The Extremes of Deference 
799 
Theories of judicial deference fall on a spectrum bounded at the 
extremes by no deference and total deference. Reviewing the extremes is 
important because the doctrines established through case law, as explained 
above, have gravitated toward one pole or the other dependent on the circum­
stances of the time. 
The key advantage to systems operating at the extremes of the deference 
spectrum lies in their simplicity. This simplicity, however, also leads to 
some of the most glaring aspects of inappropriate deference or nondeference. 
The inelasticity of the approach of each of these systems, fixed either at the 
pole of judicial supremacy or executive discretion, renders both systems con­
stitutionally suspect in addition to pragmatically undesirable. 
1. No Deference. -Some commentators advocate a system in which the 
Executive is granted no deference in the interpretation of treaties. Propo­
nents of this model generally decry any movement away from de novo 
review of interpretive questions as an abdication of the Marbury prerogative 
of the Judiciary to "say what the law is." 100 Such commentators view the de 
novo judicial review of treaty interpretation questions as a crucial check on 
executive power. The primary benefit of  such a system would be its innate 
simplicity and insulation from political manipulation. Such a system, 
however, is ultimately unfeasible and potentially infringes upon the Article II 
and Article I powers of the President and Congress, respectively. 
A no-deference policy is unfeasible primarily because it unreasonably 
hinders executive operation in implementing treaties. It is ultimately unde­
sirable because while it creates a robust buffer in consolidating executive 
power, it also unjustly impedes deference where it is appropriate and 
desirable. As disputes over treaties are infrequent relative to those over 
domestic statutes, the ability to rely upon an established and implemented 
interpretation can be crucial to effective foreign policy. The Executive 
Branch is empowered with the routine enforcement and execution of treaty 
obligations. Its diplomatic corps routinely operates under the interpretations 
of the Executive, and regulations are promulgated in reliance on those 
interpretations, a reliance that would break down in the face of complete 
judicial authority to reinterpret. 
Providing no deference to executive interpretations could also constitute 
an infringement of the Article II powers of the President to exercise 
100. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 1 37, 1 77 ( 1 803). For example, Thomas Franck 
describes the Judiciary's retreat from cases involving "political questions" as a "Faustian pact." 
THOMAS M. FRANCK POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY 
TO FOREIGN AFFAIR�? 13,  1 0-1 3 (1 992); see also, e.g., Bradley, supra note 3, at 665 ("Almost 
invariably these commentators [criticizing judicial deference to the executive] invoke �he 
importance of the 'rule of law' and quote reverently from Marbury. . .  . [They] use phrases like 
'judicial abdication '  and talk about the courts having made 'Faustian pacts. "' (citing FRANCK, 
supra, at 1 0- 1 1 and Bederman, supra note 4, at 1442)). 
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executive powers related to treaty interpretation. The independ
ent power of 
the Executive to provide interpretive meaning was demonstrated thr
ough the 
controversy over the reinterpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
 
(ABM Treaty) between the United States and the Soviet Union. 10 1  In 1 985, 
President Reagan asserted that the Executive would, in the future, read the 
ABM Treaty to allow technological work designed to develop a missile­
defense system. 1 02 Many in the Senate dissented to no avail .  103 The ultimate 
success of the executive reinterpretation of the treaty was, in part, due to in­
herent power that adheres to the execution of treaty provisions that, by their . b " 
. 1 04 very nature, contam am 1gmty. 
Similarly, a no-deference system could violate Article l powers of the 
Legislature in circumstances where the Congress has utilized its power to 
define and punish crimes against the law of nations, 1 0
5 taken steps to define 
U.S.  treaty obligations and limitations, 1 06 or delegated power to the Executive 
to promulgate regulations. 107 As an example, it would be folly for the courts 
to reject an executive interpretation where that interpretation was endorsed 
by Congress or represented the exercise of clearly delegated powers from the 
Legislature. 1 08 
As noted above, a no-deference approach may have held considerable 
sway immediately following the Founding, but the political circumstances 
and doctrine have moved decisively away from the approach. Instead, the 
Court has embraced a doctrine much closer to total deference . 
. �· Total Deference.-Proponents of total deference highlight the 
politiCal nature of treaties as a part of international relations as well as the 
flexibility and democratic accountability of the Executive. Under a total-
101 .  Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems U S -U S S R  May 26 1972 
23 U.S.T. 3435. ' 
. . . . . ., ' ' 
264
�02·
2
�:��ol� Hongju Koh, Wh;: Do Natio�s .Obey International Law?, 1 06 YALE L.J. 2
599, 
" 
. 
• . ( 997) (book review) (outlmmg the Reagan Administration's proposed remterpretatlon" of the ABM Treaty, which would in essence have amended the treaty without the 
consent of either the Senate or the Soviet Union). 
103. !d. at 2646--48.  
1 04. !d. at 2647. 
105. See U.S. CONST art I § 8 I 10 ( b l . h. 
"d fi d . h . . · 
· ' ' c · esta Is mg that Congress shall have the power to 
f
e
N
m
t
� an,)
pums Prracles and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law 
o a IOns . 
C 
106· 1:· 
h
art.
S 
II, § 2• cl. 2 ("[The
. 
President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and (e:;�:�i� 
a
�:
ed
��ate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . . 
" 
107· !d. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 8. (establishing Congress's power to "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrymg mto Execution the foregoing Powers"). 
108. Hamdan serves as an example wh th c 
context of the Uniform c d f M"li J 
ere e ourt found such delegation lacking in the 
0 e 0 1 tary ushce. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774-75 
�;���iga%
o
:=���:::
r, that;he Court
d 
re
b
cognized that Congress did delegate some authority to 
, proce ures, an su stanhve law under U.S. courts-martial. !d. 
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deference system, the courts defer to treaty interpretations of the Executive 
regardless of their form or apparent inconsistency with treaty text or practice. 
Under total deference, flexibility to conduct foreign affairs is 
tantamount. Advocates of sweeping deference argue that the political nature 
of trea
.
ties and changing landscape of international relations require the 
Executrve to be able to change its interpretation of treaty obligations on the 
fly. 1 09 Legally, advocates contend that the treaty power is "executive in 
nature" and that it includes a structural power to interpret treaties 
independent from judicial infringement. 1 1 0 According to this argument, the 
fact that the Executive is the center of gravity in treaty interpretation as a 
practical matter is enough evidence that the consolidation of all treaty­
interpretation concerns should be confined within that Branch. 1 1 1  
Functionally, the total-deference model places enormous strain on the 
institutional values present in executive action and correspondingly little 
value in judicial action. A model of total deference maximizes executive 
flexibility, resulting in a system of completely unchecked power over treaty 
interpretation, which would inevitably lead to manipulation and, ultimately, 
widespread treaty failure. 1 1 2 
The legal basis of a total-deference regime is also questionable. A core 
holding of Supreme Court jurisprudence is that an independent role of the 
Judiciary is required in interpreting treaties to provide meaning to federal 
law. 1 1 3 In the Supreme Court 's  2006 decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. 
Oregon, 1 14 the Court examined the extent to which U.S. courts are bound by 
decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) relative to the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). 1 1 5  While not deciding the issue 
109. See Yoo, supra note 12, at 870-77 (providing examples of the Executive 's ability to better 
adapt to the turbulent landscape of international relations, such as the notion that the President's 
decision-making processes can take on degrees of speed, secrecy, flexibility, and efficiency that no 
other governmental institution can match). 
1 10. See. e.g. , id. at 869 ("Article Il's Vesting Clause must refer to inherent executive and 
judicial powers unenumerated elsewhere in the document."). 
I l l . !d. at 870. 
1 1 2. It is easy to imagine that after repeated instances of treaty "reinterpretations" rendering 
treaty violations lawful, the treaty partners will react similarly in retaliation. A rejoinder to this 
concern would contend that as long as those politically accountable are making that decision, they 
can be held responsible in the course of elections. This reb.
uttal is only effective to the e�tent o�e 
believes that such accountability will preclude "reinterpretatiOns" generally. Alas, most evidence IS 
to the contrary, essentially demonstrating that the political branches are the most likely to follow the 
path most politically expedient at that moment. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal 
Separation of Powers: Checking Today 's Most Dangerous f!ranch [rom Within, . 1. 1 5  YALE L.J. 
23 14, 23 1 9-22 (2006) (discussing perverse incentives in dec lSI on making by the political branc�es ). 
As such, short-term calculations are likely to sacrifice long-term policy goals, such as generalized 
treaty compliance and good faith. 
1 1 3. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006) ("If treaties are to be give.n 
effect as federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning as a matter of federal law IS 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
1 1 4. 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006). 
1 15. !d. at 2684-85. 
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of whether the VCCR created a private right of action, the Court reje
cted the 
petitioners ' request for substantial deference
1 1 6 to the ICJ ' s  holdings in 
LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America/ 1 7  and Case 
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexic� v. Unite� States of 
America) . 1 1 8  Without a private right of action, the questton of the tmpact of 
the VCCR and the ICJ j udgments interpreting the VCCR hinged, in part, on 
the Supreme Court' s  understanding of j udicial power and nondelegation. To 
this end, the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts noted: "[I]f 
treaties are to be given effect as federal law under our legal system, 
determining their meaning as a matter of federal law ' is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department' headed by the ' one supreme 
b " h d b h c . .  " 1 1 9 Court' esta hs e y t e onstltutton. 
Accompanying the Court' s  protective stance from foreign interference 
is an assertive positioning of Article III powers against interference from 
other branches of the domestic government. This conception is underlined 
by Chief Justice Roberts ' s  favorable citation and parenthetical 1 20 to Justice 
Stevens' s  opinion in Williams v. Taylor, 1 2 1  i n  which the Court held: "At the 
core of [the judicial] power is the federal courts ' independent 
responsibility-independent from its coequal branches in the Federal 
Government, and independent from the separate authority of the several 
States-to interpret federal law." 1 22 Despite the consistent triumph of execu­
tive interpretations over the past fifty years, likely in part because of the 
reluctance of the Judiciary to completely cede all powers over treaty 
interpretation (as demonstrated by cases like Sanchez-Llamas), total 
deference has also not been in favor. 
C. The Search for a Principled Standard of Deference 
The infeasibility and constitutional infirmities of no-deference and total­
de
_
fer�nce regimes have led to a more considered approach to developing a 
pnnctpled system of deference that maximizes institutional benefits of the 
�ranches. The system sought must be "principled" in its offering of guide­
hoes and rules that can be readily ascertained and applied by judicial means. 
�here
_ �
e two systems of deference, already present and applied in 
Amencan JUrisprudence, that serve as primary candidates for transplantation 
to the realm of treaty interpretation: Chevron-style deference and Skidmore­
style deference. The academic literature to date has heavily favored Chevron 
1 16. !d. at 2685-86. 
1 1 7. 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27). 
1 18. 2004 I.C.J. 1 2  (Mar. 3 1 ). 
177
?
1
98o�)�chez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2684 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (l Cranch) 137, 
120. !d. 
1 2 1 .  529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
122. !d. at 378-79. 
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de�erence as the preferred alternative to the morass of great weight, while 
Skidmore deference has been largely unexamined. 
I. Chevron Deference.-In recent years, several scholars have 
attempted to fill the theoretical void of deference in foreign-affairs law with 
the already-built administrative law doctrine of deference articulated in 
Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (commonly 
known as Chevron deference). 123 Chevron deference, as articulated by the 
famous decision that thrust it to prominence, consists of a two-part inquiry. 
First, has Congress  directly decided the precise question at issue? 124 Second, 
if Congress has not so spoken-if the statute is silent or ambiguous with re­
spect to the specific issue-was the agency's decision at issue reasonable and 
thus permissible? 1 25 Assuming the text is  ambiguous and the views of the 
Executive are reasonable, the executive interpretation triumphs. 
a. Chevron 's Operation.-The Chevron standard of "ambiguity" 
and "reasonableness" could, at the theoretical level, cut toward broad or lim­
ited deference. The test generally collapses into a reasonableness inquiry, as 
it is unlikely that an agency interpretation that acts directly contrary to un­
ambiguous text could be considered reasonable. 126 As a result, the 
deferential nature of Chevron is dependent upon the judicial interpretation of 
reasonableness. To date, the courts have consistently interpreted the term to 
offer near-total deference to agency decisions when ( l )  congressional dele­
gation of authority can be inferred; (2) agency specialization is evident; and 
(3) procedural safeguards are respected. 127 
Professor Curtis Bradley 's piece, Chevron Deference and Foreign 
Affairs, starts his proposal for Chevron deference from the premise that the 
theoretical framework articulated by Chevron translates comfortably to for­
eign affairs. 128 Professors Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein extend Professor 
Bradley's argument into a more-broad-based functional and theoretical call 
123. E.g. , Bradley, supra note 3, at 679 (focusing on three types of foreign-affairs law to which 
Chevron deference should apply: federal statutory law, both treaty-based and customary 
international law and the federal common Jaw of foreign relations); Posner & Sunstein . .  l'llpra note 
69, at 1 228 (c�ncluding that courts should defer to executive interpretations of ambiguous 
enactments and that because clear legislation is controlling under Chel'ron step one. nothmg m that 
argument excludes the possibility that Congress is entitled to the last word). 
124. Chevron U. S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837. 842 ( 1 984). 
125. !d. at 843. 
126. See Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron: A n  Empirical Study of' the . Chevron 
Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1 5  YALE J. ON REG. I ,  30-3 1 ( 1 998) (analyzmg court 
applications of the Chevron doctrine and finding a substantial majority of courts uphold agency 
interpretations, especially when courts reach the question of reasonableness). . . 
127. See, e.g. , Texas v. United States, 497 F.3d 49 1 ,  501-04 (5th Cir. 2�7 )  (applymg vers
iOns 
of these three factors when determining the reasonableness of the agency s mterpretatJOn of the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act). . . 
128. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 703 (arguing that Chevron-d�ference pnnct_ples an
d values fit 
comfortably within the realm o f foreign affairs generally and treaty mterpretatton m particular). 
804 Texas Law Review 
[Vol. 86:777 
for applying Chevron deference in nearly �ll asp�cts. 
of foreign-rela��ons law 
and, in particular, applying it to questiOns signtficant to 
the war on 
terror."129 Posner and Sunstein' s view of Chevron deference go
es beyond 
traditional justifications present in the administrative r�alm and arg
u
.
es t
.
hat 
Chevron deference is p articularly suited to foreign affairs due to the mst
Jtu­
tional advantages possessed by the Executive over other branches of 
1 30 government. 
The thrust of these commentators ' arguments is that Chevron is an 
appropriate system of deference because it acknowledges both the unique 
expertise of the Executive in foreign affairs and is generated through a politi­
cally accountable mechanism, the Executive Branch. 1 3 1  Further, the doctrine 
carries with it practical benefits that accrue through its familiar, established 
position in administrative law. 132 
b. Chevron as Excessively Deferential.-The common critique of 
Chevron deference in the context of treaty interpretations is that it is too def­
erential to executive interpretations. The question of whether a doctrine is 
excessively deferential is only answerable by assessing whether the stated 
goals and justifications of the proposed system of deference are achieved. 
Proponents of Chevron deference p lace great importance on the role of 
the Judiciary in ascertaining the "reasonableness" of executive interpretations 
in the face of "genuinely ambiguous statutes ." 1 33 In practice, however, this 
role is largely illusory. At the theoretical level, adopting Chevron deference 
in foreign affairs places great weight on genuine ambiguity and reasonable­
ness determinations, concepts that are subj ect to interpretive differences of a 
wider variety than substantive limitations. 1 34 The practical level bears out the 
theoretical concerns. As Professors Schuck and Elliott demonstrate 
empirically, relatively few cases in which Chevron is applied result in a 
1 29. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 69, at 1 1 77 n. 14 (distinguishing the approach offered 
by Professor Bradley). 
1 30. !d. at 1 176-77. 
�? 1 .  See �radley, SUP_ra ,?ote 3, at 673 (explaining that the Executive is particularly well suited for Interpretive lawmakmg because it has "more expertise and democratic accountability than 
courts"); Pos�er 
.� S�nstein, supra note 69, at 1 1 77, 1 1 76-77 (arguing that the resolution of 
statutory ambtgmtles m this context eq · "" d · · · . . . 
r mres JU gments of pohcy and pnnc1ple" and that the 
Executt�e �as both the fore1gn-pohcy expertise and the "constitutional warrant" for making those 
underlymg Judgments). 
. 
1 32· 
d 
Stecitc;lly, the doctrine has been the subject of substantial scrutiny and has gathered an mcrease
bl 
eve � proced�al . clarity as a result. The Judiciary is familiar with the doctrine and presuma y comwrtable wtth 1ts application. 
133 .  Posner & Sunstein supra note 69 t 1 226 Wh" 
· c · f" · p 
' ' a · tle not a "proponent" of Chevron deference m •ore1gn a taus, rofessor Robert Chesney asserts that Chevr " 1 · 1 · ful degree of ·ud· · 1 · d d , on preserves a re ative y meanmg J !Cia m epen ence. Chesney, supra note 4 at 1 766 
134. See Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar K ty 1 D · 
' 
· 
. 
L J 1230 1269 (2007) ( · · . 
a 
.
a '  . lSregardmg Foreign Relations Law, 1 1 6 YALE 
· b. 
'
, 
d 
cntlqumg the apphcat10n of "genuinely ambiguous" or "vague and am 1guous stan ards (quoting Posner & Sunstein, supra note 69, at 1 2 1 7, 1227)). 
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judicial finding that the agency interpretation is "unreasonable." 135 A stud 
by Professors Sunstein and Miles indicate that "on both the Supreme Cou� 
and the courts of appeals, the application of the Chevron framework is 
greatly affected by the j udges' own (political] convictions. . . . [T]he data 
reveal a strong
. 
�elationship between the j ustices' ideological predispositions 
and the probabil ity that they will validate agency determinations."136 Judicial 
practice in other foreign-affairs nonjusticiability and abstention doctrines is 
in�t
.
�ctive and indicates that it is likely that the deference afforded by  judges 
ut1hzmg Chevron in the treaty context would be based on an internal assess­
ment of the foreign effects of their decisions that they are least likely to 
accurately gauge. 1 37 
c. Chevron as Insufficiently Deferential-The overarching 
difficulty with Chevron is that its principles do not extend to the 
particularities of treaties. Ultimately, the problem with Chevron deference 
may not be solely that it provides too much deference to the Executive, but 
that in certain circumstances, it clearly does not provide enough deference to 
executive determinations. 
There are a host of conceivable c ircumstances that could arise where 
deference would be desirable but where Chevron would not apply under es­
tablished norms of deference. 138 Consider an executive interpretation of a 
treaty articulated purely as a litigation position. Under traditional concep­
tions of Chevron deference, litigation positions are not entitled to any 
deference. 139 The same would be true when the interpretive view is traceable 
to an executive officer or division that does not appear to have expertise in 
1 35. See Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of 
Federal Administrative Law, 1 990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1 057-59 (finding that circuit courts deferred to 
agency decisions at a higher rate after Chevron was decided-a rate that shows it is very unlikely an 
agency's interpretation will be deemed unreasonable if entitled to Chevron deference). 
136. Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical 
Investigation ofChevron, 73 U.  CHI. L. REV. 823, 825-26 (2006). 
1 37. See Goldsmith, supra note 8 1 ,  at 1 396 (arguing that the foreign-relations doctrines involve 
judicial identification and assessment of the foreign-relations interests of the United States and 
predicting "the effects of certain acts . . .  on these interests"). 
138. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 1 87� 236, 23 1-47 
(2006) (noting the problems with the Supreme Court's current framework for dec1dmg when to 
apply Chevron deference, including its apparent endorsement of an "exception" from Chevron 
deference for "major questions" of statutory interpretation that in the Court's view require judicial 
review). 
139. See, e.g. , United States v. Mead Corp.,  533 U.S. 218, 
. 2
34 (200 1 )  (holding that 
classification rulings issued by the U.S. Customs Office are not entttled to Chevron �efe:ence 
because they are more akin to policy statements, agency manuals, and �nforceme�t gmdelm�s); 
Matz v. Household Int'l Tax Reduction Inv. Plan, 265 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Crr. 2001 )  ( Upon readmg 
Mead, we find that a litigation position in an amicus brief, perhaps just as agency interpretations of 
statutes contained in formats such as opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and 
enforcement guidelines are entitled to respect only to the extent that those interpretations have the 
power to persuade pursuant to Skidmore." (citation omitted)). 
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the subject matter regulated140 or was not generated through an accountable 
mechanism. 1 41 The political nature of treaties might counsel for broad defer­
ence in such circumstances despite Chevron 's  inapplicability. For example, 
even if not subject to notice-and-comment rule making and articulated as a 
litigation position, the Executive may be engaged in regularized dip
_
lomatic 
efforts that require reliance on a particular interpretation of the treaty m order 
to gain corresponding political advantages abroad. Even absent 
specialization, deference may be appropriate in such circumstances. 
Otherwise judgments forming a consistent diplomatic process would be in 
jeopardy, thus requiring a change in diplomatic practice and imposing a sub­
stantial burden on the Executive in conducting foreign policy. 
One might think that the answer to the difficulty of utilizing traditional 
conceptions of Chevron in foreign affairs is to expand the already-expansive 
Chevron doctrine to cover any executive interpretation in foreign affairs. 142 
The inextricable difficulty of expanding the contours of Chevron deference is 
that the administrative law principles establishing the doctrine are structured 
to preclude abuse of the broad deference Chevron already affords. Preclud­
ing such abuse is j ust as important, if not more so, when one considers the 
underappreciated legal nature of treaties,  formed in large part outside of ex­
ecutive control and often containing important executive-constraining 
substantive provisions . 
d. The Difficulty in Translating Chevron into Treaty 
Interpretation.-The justifications of Chevron of exploiting executive 
expertise and preserving executive flexibility are both compromised under an 
expansive view of Chevron deference.  A cornerstone of the Chevron doc­
trine is based on the belief that administrative agencies have ( 1)  been 
?elegated 
_
interpretive authority by Congress and (2) possess unique expertise 
m the subject matter in which they are regulating. 143 
. 140. He.re Gonz�les v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) is instructive. In this case the Court reJected an mterpretlve position offered by the Attorney General due to lack of medic;! expertise. 
!d. at 268-75 . 
. 1� 1 .  See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S.  576, 588 (2000) (holding that an agency 
opmiOn letter was not entitled to Chevron deference because it was not subject to notice-and­
comment rule makmg) .  
142· This i s  essentially the position o f  Posner and Sunstein. Compare Posner & Sunstein 
sup
! 
r
t
? not
d
e 69� at 
b
1 1 7 7  n. l 4  (advocating for the application of Chevron deference to foreign� 
re a Ions octnnes ased on theoretical and fun · 1 
rf · fi · 
ct10na reasons such as the Executive's "superior 
�:���:� ;o=�� h
r�latiors."), wi,
�h Bradley, supra note 3, a� 673, 673-74 (arguing, on largely 
valuable frarnew�rk 
a
fi 
app �ng a C:hevron perspective" to foreign-affairs cases would provide a 
constraints on the Ex
or 
t
un erstan
hil 
dmg many of the foreign-affairs doctrines and impose legal ecu 1ve w e accounting for r · · fi · 
affairs). 
execu 1ve expertise and authority m ore1gn 
143. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res D f C . 
(explaining that Congress has d 1 t d 1 .  
· . e · ouncli, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) e ega e po Icy making respo "bTt. · · b 
those agencies possess "gr t . 
, . . . ns1 I 1 1es to agencies, m part ecause ea expertise m theu respective areas). 
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. 
\_\'
.
hen viewed through the analytical lens of maximizing administrative 
flextbtht
.
y, the Ch�vron model does quite well .  It is very uncommon for an 
agency mterpretat ton to be overturned once i t  is found to be entitled to 
Chevron defercnce. 1 44 The promise of substantial deference also frees the 
agen
.
cy to e�gagc in comprehensive regulatory schemes with little concern 
that Its core mtcrpretive holdings will be overturned. 
However, many treaty regimes do not fulfill either of these elements of 
the expertise equation. Unlike administrative law, treaties are not executed 
w
.
it� an implicit delegation of interpretive authority from Congress. 145 
Stmtlarly, most treaties to which the United States is a p arty are not 
a�enab
.
le to the routine and consistent application by a core group of profes­
Sionals msulated from the larger political machinations of the Presidency. 
Chevron deference is only justified to the extent that Congress has, at 
least implicitly, delegated lawmaking authority to another body for the pur­
pose of administering specific law. 1 46 Under United States v. Mead Corp./47 
agency interpretations only receive Chevron deference when the congres­
sional intent in delegation was "to carry the force of law."148 In assessing 
whether the admini strative agency had received the proper delegation, the 
Court indicated that full and fair process should underlie administrative 
144. See supra note 1 35 and accompanying text. 
145. Unlike questions as to the content of customary international law, treaties form part of the 
"supreme Law of the L and" o f  the United States . U.S.  CONST. art. VI. This status embeds treaties 
as part of the domestic legal landscape alongside the Constitution and statutes of the United States. 
146. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron 's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. 
REv. 20 I ,  2 1 1  (characterizing application of the Chevron doctrine as subject to a judicial finding of 
"indicia of contrary congressional desire" regarding deference to agency authority). Subsequent 
decisions and academic commentary have mainly divided the potential rationale for deference into 
three elements. First, administrative agencies possess unique expertise and flexibility in their field 
of operation. Judicial interpretations rejecting administrative counterparts would hinder 
administrative operation by requiring a congressional act, or higher judicial action. Such contrary 
interpretive decisions would be more numerous absent robust deference. Second, the resolution of 
"gaps or ambiguities" in federal law should be left to an institution politically accountable for its 
actions. Interpretive acts inherently require policy judgments that the Judicial Branch is least 
equipped to make. Finally, the complexity of the administrative state and p lethora of policy 
judgments left to Congress has meant that the Legislative Branch intentionally delegates the task of 
interpretation to the relevant agency. This delegation enables the agency to utilize its institutional 
benefits of flexibility and expertise clothed with the authority of legitimate power. See generally, 
e.g. , Laborers' Int'l Union v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 391 n. 1 2  (3d Cir. 1 994) (listing 
two paramount rationales for deference as expertise and congressional intent); Mich. Citizens for an 
lndep. Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1 285, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1 989) (listing two mai� rational�s for 
deference as agency expertise and a preference for political br�nches to �ake pol.Ic� deciSions), 
af 'd by an equally divided Court, 493 U.S.  38 ( 1 989); Fed. ElectiOn Comm n v. Christian Coal., 52 
F. Supp. 2d 45, 82 n.40 (D.D.C. 1 999) (listing two leading rationales for deference as agency 
expertise and a preference for political branches to make policy decisions because of political 
accountability); Elliot Greenfield, A Lenity Exception to Chevron Deference, 58 BA.
YLOR L. �v. 1 ,  
1 9-20 (2006) (listing rationales of expertise, accountability, and congressiOnal mtent); Nma A. 
Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 1 02 MICH. L. REv. 737, 743-44 (2004) (same). 
147. 533 U.S. 2 1 8  (200 1 ) .  
148. !d. a t  22 1 .  
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. m 1· d 
regulations designed to carry the torce o aw. uc 
an I P I
_
e 
delegation would be factually difficult to find in the treaty con�ext.
 Treat
_
Ies 
that primarily bestow individual rights infrequently require execu
tive 
dmin. . 1 50 a tstratwn. 
Similarly, treaties with a quasi-contractual element are unlikely to 
invoke the type of delegative authority necessary to trigger Chevron 
deference. 1 5 1  Delegated authorization is  not part of the treaty ratification 
process. Unlike administrative regulations, the creation of treaties as 
supreme federal law requires the interaction of C ongress through advice and 
consent. 1 52 Rather than implicit delegation fro m  the Legislature, issues of 
treaty interpretation are expressly addressed by the Senate through 
reservations, understandings, and declarations . 1 53 These interpretive devices 
provide a compelling ex ante approach that acts expressly against unilateral 
executive interpretation and provide the Legislative Branch with an 
opportunity, at the very moment of ratification, to define the nature of the 
judicial enforceability of the treaty at issue. 1 54 
Further, the core content of many U.S.  treaties is to constrain executive 
action, not to embolden it. As noted by Professors Derek Jinks and Neal 
Katyal, much of international law, including treaties, is designed to act as a 
constraint on executive power. 155 By expanding the level of deference to ex­
ecutive interpretations in such contexts under Chevron, "any practical 
advantages of [Chevron] j udicial deference are substantially offset by the 
costs of assigning robust interpretive authority to the very agency that is 
regulated by the regime."156 
The Geneva Conventions serve as a compelling example of this danger. 
The Conventions create a framework in which the Executive, charged with 
military operations, must operate. The Conventions have been implemented 
through Army regulations, which provide, "In the event of conflicts or 
1�9. See id. at 23? ("Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it 
pro�ides
. 
for a relauvely formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and 
dehberatwn tha� should underlie a pronouncement of such force."). 
1 50. See Michael P. V� �lstine, The Judicial Power and Treaty Delegation, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
1 2�3, 1 300.:-01 (�002) (descn�mg the quest10nable foundation for deference where a private right of 
acti�n provides little opportunity for the administration of executive agencies). 
5 1 .  See Evan Criddle, Comment, Chevron Deference and Treaty Interpretation 1 1 2 YALE L.J. 
1927_, 193 1 n.23 (2003) ("Treaties' contractual character helps explain why few 
'
if any treaties 
provide textual support for an impli.ed d 1 t. f · · · 
' ' 
· 
. e ega iOn o Interpretive authonty to municipal executive agencies."). 
1_52. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
,
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .  ). 
1 5 3 .  Jinks & Katyal, supra note 1 34, at 1 253 .  
1 54. See id. (discussing how the Se t 1 · 
· 
· 
· tr · t d 11 
na e can iffilt the discretion of courts by defining the cons am s an a owances to the Executive within treaties). 
155 .  !d. at 1 265. 
1 56. !d. at 1 244-45. 
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discr
.
e�ancie: between this regulation and the Geneva Conventions, the 
prov1s1ons of the Geneva Conventions take precedence." 157 
Treaty law differs from administrative law substantively and 
procedu�ally. Trca�y law, at a fundamental level, is designed to influence 
�nd out �mc appropnate state behavior. 1 58 As articulated by scholars, much of 
mtcmat10nal law is executive constraining in nature. 159 Increased deference 
to the 
.
Executiv�' s  interpretation of executive-constraining law enables the 
Execut1vc to c i rc umvent regulations previously established. Where the 
power to
. 
interpret law creates the power to evade intended regulation, the 
power to mtcrprct law constitutes the power to break such law. 
2. Institutionally Driven Deference: A Flexible Model. -Courts clearly 
consider factors outside of those accounted for in theories of total deference 
no deference, great weight, and Chevron-style deference. Nowhere is thi� 
more clearly demonstrated than in Hamdan. The majority decision, finding 
the incorporation of the Geneva Conventions through the Uniform Code of 
Mil itary Justice and extending Common Article 3 protections to those de­
tained at Guantanamo Bay, conspicuously granted no deference. 1 60 The 
Court's explanation, which tersely characterized the government ' s  proposed 
interpretation of the language "not of an international character" as 
"erroneous," 1 6 1  indicated that it considered factors other than textual 
ambiguity or reasonableness. While unarticulated by the Court, clearly the 
substance of the treaty and the boundaries of executive power were core con­
cerns in the litigation as a whole. Additionally, the Executive 's inconsistent 
application of standards relevant to the treaty and Common Article 3 in par­
ticular undermined the credibility of its position, making the Court less likely 
to defer. 1 62 
The concerns animating Hamdan represent judicial discomfort with 
making deference determinations without considering all relevant factors. A 
flexible model of deference faci litates structuring and assessing an examina­
tion of the validity of the executive interpretation and potentially 
countervailing aspects of the proposed interpretation. As demonstrated in 
Hamdan, concerns such as self-interest, specialization, and process already 
drive the inconsistent application of deference in current jurisprudence. 
1 57. U.S. Dep'ts of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps, Army Regulation 
1 90-8/0PNAVINST 346 1 .6/AFJI 3 1 -304/MCO 346 1 . 1 ,  Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained 
Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees § 1 - 1 (4) ( 1997), available at http://www.au.af. 
miVau/awc/awcgate/law/ar 1 90-8.pdf. 
1 58. Van Alstine supra note ! 50, at 1270. 
159. See Jinks & 
'
Katyal, supra note 134, at 1 234 (defining the "executive-constraining zone" of 
foreign-relations law). 
1 60. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 1 26 S. Ct. 2749, 2789-98 (2006). 
16 1 .  !d. at 2795, 2795-96. 
162. See Chesney, supra note 4, at 1 773 (describing Hamdan .
as a case in w�ich the functional 
justification for judicial deference is undermined because executive-branch entities d1d not agree 
among themselves on the correct interpretation of the treaty). 
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Current doctrine encourages a binary decision between total deference and 
no deference by the courts that ( 1 )  may be more results oriented than princi­
ple oriented, and (2) lacks nuance and structure in providing
.
an answer as to 
why some treaties-and some cases involving thos.e t�eat1es-ar� ��ated 
differently. A principled system of deference that mamta
.
ms
. 
the flex1�1h� to 
consider factors outside of basic reasonableness and amb1gmty can ehrmnate 
that deficiency. 
a. Adapting Skidmore 's Flexible Scale to Treaties.-The 
"persuasiveness" standard articulated in the Supreme Court' s  decision in 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. provides a starting point for developing a flexible 
model of deference appropriate to treaty interpretation. Under Skidmore, an 
agency's statutory interpretations are "not controlling upon the courts," and 
the weight accorded an agency interpretation "in a particular case will de­
pend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade."1 63 Skidmore instructs the 
Judiciary to assess whether the agency' s  interpretation is made "in pursuance 
of official duty, based upon more specialized experience and broader investi­
gations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case" 
a s  well as whether the agency in question determines governmental policy 
and is charged with providing guidance for the statute's  enforcement. 164 
Skidmore offers a model of deference that recognizes the special status 
of the Executive and grants deference to the extent that the government's 
operation within that status-and the substantive law that grants such 
status-imbue the Executive 's interpretation with persuasiveness. 
A primary consideration in favoring Skidmore over Chevron in 
formulating an intermediate system of deference is based on the 
particularities of treaties .  Treaties are ( 1 )  both political and legal 
instruments; (2) drafted by the Executive Branch; (3) ratified by the 
Legislature through consent; and ( 4) typically constrain both foreign and 
domestic action. The nature of treaties as legal and political devices means 
�hat there are compelling justifications for providing deference to executive 
JUdgments as to how they operate and should be interpreted. Judicial actions 
that contravene executive foreign policy can harm national foreign policy 
and compromise the ability of the Executive to speak with one voice. At the 
same �ime, tr�atie.
s 
.
create obligations that are designed to have the force of 
law �tth the Imphctt corresponding responsibility of the Judiciary to provide 
meanmg to that l aw. Treaties are not unilateral actions by the Executive; 
rather, they acquire the force of law through legislative review and consent. 
Unwarr.anted �ef�rence to executive treaty interpretations of instruments 
purportmg to lmut executive actions and that are interpreted inconsistently 
163.  Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 1 34, 140 ( 1 944). 
1 64.  ld. at 1 39, 1 3 9-40. 
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within the �xecutive
. 
Br�nc� compromises separation-of-powers principles 
and undennmes the mstitutwnal advantages the Judiciary confers through 
judicial review. 
Skidmore deference in the administrative realm weighs deference to 
agenc� decision on the following factors : ( 1 )  validity of reasoning; (2) 
expertise; (3 )  the fonn in which the interpretation was issued; and (4) 
whether its views were thoroughly considered and consistently applied. 1 65 
The application of these factors has been consolidated into a general 
articulation of persuasiveness deference based on the Court' s  own language 
that it could consider "in a particular case . . .  all  those factors which give it 
power to persuade." 1 116 The nature of this persuasiveness is often conflated 
by commentators as to whether the agency interpretation itself is 
persuasive. 167 In reality, the Skidmore factors are assigned the task of 
assessing the persuasiveness of applying deference to the agency or official 
making the interpretive decision in question. 
One might argue that the availabil ity of such a broad range of factors to 
the Judiciary would operate essentially as nondeference. 1 68 It has not played 
out in the administrative realm in that way and is even less likely to be the 
case in regards to treaties. Skidmore contemplates a more active (and thus 
less deferential) role for the Judiciary than Chevron; however, it does so on 
measurable planes that enforce accountabi lity for the Judiciary.169 Skidmore 
enforces judicial deference in that courts are precluded from ignoring agency 
interpretation, and if ultimately contradicting agency action, they must pro­
vide a justification consistent with the factors outlined by Skidmore or 
articulate some new factor that led them to their conclusion. 170 In any event, 
1 65. See id. at 1 39-40 ( discussing, explicitly and implicitly, various factors that courts should 
consider when weighing the persuasiveness of a particular agency interpretation of a statute); see 
also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristen E. Hickman, Chevron 's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 853-56 
(200 1 ) (discussing the di fferences between Chevron deference and Skidmore deference and 
expanding on the factors courts consider when applying Skidmore deference). Although the Court 
in Skidmore never lists out a fixed set of factors, these four factors capture the essence of the 
Court's flexible approach to deference to agency action. 
166. Skidmore, 323 U.S.  at 1 40. 
1 67. See, e.g. , Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 1 01 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 749, 1 807 ( 2007);  Daniel J. Gifford, The Emerging Outlines of a Revised Chevron 
Doctrine: Congressional Intent. Judicial Judgment, and Administrative Autonomy, 59 ADMIN. L. 
REv. 783, 784 (2007). 
1 68. See Molly A. Leckey & Stephanie A. Roy, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: Administrative Law, 7 2  G�o. WASH. L. RE�. 946, 954 
(2004) (arguing that under Skidmore, "the court will simply engage m a de novo revtew of the 
statute through the use of traditional tools of statutory interpretation, and if by chance, the a�ency's 
interpretation matches the court's de novo interpretation, only then will the court grant Skidmore 
deference to the agency's construction"). . . . 
1 69. At the margins. any system for deference is subject to mampul�tion . . �ee Miles. & 
Sunstein, supra note 1 36, at 847 (showing empirically that independent judtctal decisiOns applymg 
Chevron are largely motivated by ideology). 
170. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 1 65, at 855 ("Skidmore is properly regarded as a 
deference doctrine because the court cannot ignore the agency interpretation-the court must assess 
8 12 Texas Law Review
 [Vol .  86: 777 
the prospect of j udicial manipulation of articu lated stan
dards fo� ideol�gical 
ends may be a red herring. As discussed above, c�ntcmp
orary J udges mt�r­
preting and applying treaties demonstrate no destre to ove
rturn executive 
. . ' 1  11 1 7 1  mterpretatwns um atera y. . , . . 
The factors the Skidmore Court articulated as "persuas t vc m ass
essmg 
the proper amount of agency-interpretation deference arc_ 
of the �arne variety 
that create a compelling case for varying degrees of deference m the tre
aty 
context: executive self-interest; expertise; the instrument i n  question; and 
process and consistency. 
Self-interest. The "validity of reasoning" prong out l ined by Skidmorf! 
has been interpreted to encompass agency self-interests that may affect the 
appropriate level of deference due agency i nterpretation.
1 72 The Judiciary 
should consider the substance of the treaty regime at issue. part icularly 
whether the treaty purports to regulate (and thus constra i n )  core executive 
powers. 
As discussed above, a key aspect of international law is the regulation 
of state activity. The underlying concern regarding this inquiry i s  the degree 
of self-interest possessed by the Executive in its interp retation. Self­
interested interpretation is likely to arise in circumstances in which the 
relevant treaty question is the very nature of power in the Executive. If the 
purpose of the treaty regime at issue is to constrain the Executive. it would be 
a paradox to allow the Executive to reinterpret a treaty to avoid the constraint 
at issue. That paradox would encourage greater consolidation of presidential 
power without any concurrent checks on the e xercise of that power. 
While unarticulated, substance-related concerns like l y  arise for the 
Supreme Court regarding the i nterpretation of the Geneva Conventions 
offered by the Executive in Hamdan. Even though Common Article 3 was 
logically amenable to more than a single interpretation, the incentive for the 
Executive to choose the interpretation that e nhanced its own power was 
great. 
Obviously, the fact that a treaty' s  subj ect matter touches on executive 
power does not, by itself, require the Judiciary to decrease its deference to an 
tha
d
t interpretat�on again�t multiple factors and determine what weight they should be given. After un ertaking th1s analysis however agency 
· 
t 
· 
· 
· fr . 
' 
• 
m erpretatwns receive various degrees of deference. rangmg om none, to shght, to great . . . .  "). 
1 7 1 .  A greater concern arises in the· · 
· 
d d 
relations that their own d 
· · . h 
Ir misgui e attempts to gauge the effects on foreign 
position. See Goldsmith 
s ectswn: �:g t 
1
•;cur •.f they were to decide against the Executive's 
1 72 S T. h 
• upra no e ' at 96 (d1scussmg the "foreign relations effects test"). . ee Imot y K Armstrong Chcvr D .r. 
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203 
. 
267 (2004)
, 
( . 
on eJer�nce and Agency Selt:fnterest. 1 3  CORNELL 
"proper for a court to m
�asure th 
not
b
m
l
g that unlike Sk,dmOI�e, nowhere under Chevron is it 
e reasona eness of an agenc 
' 1 · . . . of the agency's self-interest"). Y 
s m erpretat10n agamst the cntenon 
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execut�ve
. 
interpretation. This is especiall y  true when congressional 
authonzat10n relevant to the interpretive i ssue i s  present. 1 73 
Expertise. As Skidmore recognized, the amount of deference due an 
executive interpretation should somewhat vary based on the level of 
expertise possessed by the interpreting agent. 
The basis for the Executive ' s  expertise in treaties stems from its 
position as the drafting agent of the United States. Interpretive questions 
often turn on the intent of the parties to the treaty, and the Executive pos­
sesses some inherent special ized knowledge from that role. Further, treaties 
vary in the amount of formal record and commentary produced during the 
drafting and consummation of the agreement. The greater the volume of the 
official record, the less the Judiciary is  reliant on executive assertions as to 
the meaning, intent, or purpose of the language. 
The Executive may also possess special knowledge about treaty 
application. As the everyday executor of treaty obligations, the Executive is 
forced to make interpretive decisions consistent with its international obliga­
tions as well as corresponding international-relations pressures.  The process 
by which those decisions are made, often i n  cooperation with treaty partners, 
can offer additional expertise that would be relevant to a revie wing court. 
Instrument. The courts should consider the type of i nstrument the 
Executive is interpreting. In addition to Article II treaties, the Executive 
effectuates international agreements through sole executive agreements and 
congressional-executive agreements. 
At one end of a Skidmore-inspired model of deference, sole executive 
agreements should be given the greatest level of deference. Unlike Article II 
treaties, executive agreements do not constitute supreme federal law and tend 
to effectuate political rather than legal ends. 1 74 More importantly, they are 
concluded without the involvement o f  the Legislative Branch of the 
1 73. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 n.23 (2006) (noting that the President 
"may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in  proper exercise of its own war powers, placed 
on his powers"); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding an 
executive order seizing steel mills unconstitutional because congressional legislation on .t
he subject 
gave the Executive no such right). This is not to say, however, that there are no hm1tatwns on the 
ability of the political branches to preclude or mandate an interpretive issue to the Judiciary without 
altering the status of the underlying treaty as supreme federal law. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 
126 S. Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006) (stating that if treaties are to be treated as supreme federal law, 
"determining their meaning as a matter of federal law ' is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department"' (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( 1  Cranch) 1 37, 177  ( 1 803))). 
1 74. See Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: International Claim Settlement by 
the President 44 HARV. JNT 'L L.J. ! ,  1 3  (2003) ("Whatever the appropriate line between sole 
executive agr�ements and treaties, the text of the Constitution seems. cle.ar that o�ly tr�aties h
ave the 
force of domestic Jaw."). One example is the requirement of the diSmissal of htigatwn m o�der to 
avoid additional litigation or political turmoil with another nation. See Agreement Concemmg the 
Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future," U.S.-F.R.G., Ju�� 1 7: 2000, �9 I.L.M. 
1298 (outlining the agreement between the United States and Germany that htlgatwn relatmg.to the 
Holocaust be dismissed in favor of a German administrative solution des1gned to prov1de restltutwn 
for victims of the Holocaust). 
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government and thus can be exclusiv�ly tied to ��ecutive action and 
executive aims for purposes of democratic accountability. The absence of 
cross-institutional exchange with the Legislature also places the Executive in 
a special position as to an agreement' s  mean i ng. 
Article II treaties are made partially outside the Executive Branch and 
I 1 1s Th constitute supreme federal law under the Supremacy C ause. e 
Executive' s  position as "keeper" of an Article I I  treaty is thus substantially 
limited, and the constitutional requirement of "Advice and Consent" 176 is it­
self a limitation on the ability of the Executive to interpretively act without 
the endorsement of the Legislative Branch. 
As the genre of international agreement that owes its generation to the 
greatest amount of cross-institutional exchange and, correspondingly, to the 
least amount of unfettered executive action, congressional-executive agree­
ments would require the least amount o f  deference. 
Process and Consistency. Executive interpretations should be granted 
greater deference in contexts in which the Executive has demonstrated a con­
sistent interpretive tact or in which Executive policy is reliant on an 
established interpretation of the treaty at issue. 1 77 
In addition to serving as a general indicator that the treaty interpretation 
proffered by the Executive is an act of good faith, consistent interpretations 
by the Executive may create reliance, any deviation from which may cause 
the Executive to undertake a substantial burden. 
This consistency-and-reliance theme is procedurally enhanced when the 
Executive is required via treaty to participate in international forums de­
signed to monitor U.S.  treaty compliance or for treaty adjudication. This 
circumstance arises frequently, for instance, i n  the realm of human rights 
treaties . 178 In circumstances where the Executive adheres to a consistent 
interpretation of treaty obligations in such international forums, courts should 
enhance deference. 
This procedural consideration is  also relevant in circumstances where 
the United States engages in compliance supervision of treaty partners 
through a mechanism within the treaty or as part of a reciprocal agreement. 179 
175 .  U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
1 76. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
1 77. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 1 34, 1 40 ( 1944). 
1 78 .
. 
See, e.g. , Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
Internatzonal Human Rights Law 54 DUKE L J 62 1 688 (2004) (d ·b·  th 't · 
. . . 
' . 
· 
· 
, escn mg e mom onng 
reqUlreme�ts of the SIX maJor human nghts treaties-to many of which the United States is a party-whtch mc1ude the regular submission of compliance reports to a supervisory organ of the treaty body). 
l 1 79 . . See, e.g. , Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to nternatzonal Law 82 AM J INT'L L 336 348 · · 
. . ' · · · ' ( 1 988) (hstmg monitoring by the United States 
�o�g:;.
o��tons inF an ��s-control and disarmament treaty between the United States and the 
U�i�ed St�tes �:��ed An �h;�· ?
Comment, AIDS, Anthrax, ��d Compulsory Licensing: Has the 
Property Ri hts 0r Ph 
y �· A Comment on Recent DeciSions on the International Intellectual g ':! armaceuflcal Patents, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 185, 1 96 (2002) (observing 
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In those circumstances . the rec iprocal nat ure o f  the treaty obl igations at issue 
and the ability of U . S .  treaty partners to engage in j udgments of prediction 
and value are compromised . 
b. The Line Between Skidmore and Chcvron .-Skidmore deference 
effectuates a meaningful di fference from the type and source of deference 
available under Che,·twl, where deference is l imited to c ircumstances in 
which Congress has delegated lawmaking authority. This c rucial dimension 
in Chevron is irrelevant in .\'kidmore. as long as the Executive possesses the 
requisite expertise in the subject matter being interpreted. 
Chevron deference acts as a bi nary operation. Once the determination is 
made that the text is ambiguous. the Judiciary is left to determine reason­
ableness and, if reasonable, adopt the agency interpretation. Skidmore 
deference operates on a sl iding scale, enabl ing the Judiciary to give defer­
ence to the agency's interpretation along a spectrum from very little to very 
strong deference. 1 110 
While Chevron ' s  reasonableness assessment sweeps m some 
considerations also relevant under Skidmore, the reasonableness 
determination has focused on rationality, not process. Skidmore enables the 
courts to assess the consistency of the Executive in its interpretations, as well 
as the relevance of the substantive matters at issue-neither of which consid­
erations are given much weight in the Chevron-deference context . 1 8 1  
The concerns animating the growth of the Chevron doctrine, and 
particularly the issue of respecting congressional delegation, should not be 
discarded to incorporate Skidmore deference in foreign affairs. The incorpo­
ration of Skidmore considerations in cases purporting to apply Chevron has 
shown, according to Judge Richard Posner, that recent Supreme Court 
jurisprudence "suggests a merger between Chevron deference and 
Skidmore's and Glover' s  approach of varying the deference that agency deci­
sions receive in accordance with the circumstances." 1 82 Judge Easterbrook, 
in concurrence, maintained that while he did "not perceive . . .  any 'merger"' 
that China's obligations relating to its negotiated accession to the World Trade Organization would 
be monitored by the United States). 
180. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 165, at 855 ("Skidmore is properly regarded as a 
deference doctrine because the court cannot ignore the agency interpretation-the court must assess 
that interpretation against multiple factors and determine what w_
eight t�ey should be given. After 
undertaking this analysis, however, agency interpretations recetve vanous degrees of deference, 
ranging from none, to slight, to great, depending on the court's assessment of the strength of the 
agency interpretation under consideration."). . 
1 8 1 .  Id. at 856; see, e.g. , Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U .� . 173_, 187, 1�6-87 ( 1 99 1 )  (statl�g th_at an 
agency's interpretation that breaks dramatically from 1ts p�or postttOn on a �atter w_tll still �e 
afforded deference so tong as it is a permissible constructiOn of the statute m questton and ts 
justified by a "reasoned analysis" (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S.,  Inc. v. State
 
Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 ( 1983))). . 
1 82. Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 3 1 4  F.3d 875, 879 (7th Cir. 2002); se_
e id. (relymg on 
language from Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 2 1 2  (2002) that o�thnes co�tderanon� t
he Supreme 
Court has found persuasive in deciding when Chevron deference IS appropnately apphed). 
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between Skidmore and Chevron, they were two doctrines that acted alongside
 
1 83 each other. 
The rejection of fixed-point deference in favor of the adoption of a 
Skidmoresque rule in treaty interpretation does not preclude, but rather 
embraces, stronger Chevronesque deference in circumsta�ces where the 
Executive has been granted implied delegation from the Leg1slature and en­
gaged in some type of extensive process, such as notice-and-comme�t :ute 
making. The incorporation of such quintessential Chevron concerns w1thm a 
larger framework also highlights the attractiveness of a flexible framework to 
create calibrated deference. 
V. Conclusion 
The inextricable morass of doctrine in treaty interpretation betrays a 
doctrine without c ogent theory. The challenge for the Judiciary is to articu­
late a c lear and principled theory of deference that respects both the political 
and legal nature of treaties, and expands and contracts as circumstances 
reqmre. 
As demonstrated above, systems of deference designed to fix the level 
of deference at no deference or total deference are impractical largely due to 
their inelasticity. In no-deference systems, political realities that the 
Executive faces in treaty execution are given no weight, and the courts are 
left to construe the meaning of the treaty in question within the strict legal 
confines of the text and history of the instrument. 1 84 Similarly, total defer­
ence undermines the status of treaties as supreme federal law by providing 
them no weight as legal instruments,  despite the fact that the core substance 
of much of treaty law is specifically designed to constrain the Executive in its 
actions. 
Chevron deference is designed to overcome these objections through its 
emphasis on ambiguity185 and reasonableness, thus providing a meaningful 
judicial role while ceding substantial ground to the Executive's prerogative 
of discretion and flexibility in foreign affairs. As noted above, the Chevron 
model relies on presumptions of congressional delegation and executive 
1 83. ld. at 882 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("I do not perceive in Walton any 'merger' . . · 
between Chevron and Skidmore, which Mead took such pains to distinguish. HUD's interpretation 
ts on the Skidmore side of the line."). 
1 84. Further, any such history is frequently, if not usually, sparse and inconsistent. 
185.  Professors Posner and Sunstein emphasized that any such ambiguity must be genuine before any controversy as to the propriety of executive action should arise. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note. 69, at 1 178 (emphasizing that their analysis is restricted to instances of genuine ambtgmty 
.
m the �overning law and would not apply to clear congressional mandates, even with respect to mtemat10nal law created thr h If · · · · · fti 
b . . 
oug se -executmg treaties or treaties given domestic e ect 
. Y clear �ongresst?nal act10n). Professors Jinks and Katyal on the other hand point out the mherent dif iculty m detenn· · h th h · · · ' · 
' 
. 
mmg w e er sue ambtgwty IS genume. See Jinks & Katyal supra note 134, at 1269 (argumg th t " · b "  · " · 
' 
. . a genume am 1gu1ty has no consistently measurable standard as, consciously or unconsciOusly amb· ·ty · th 1 · · · · 
l ) ' !gut m e aw IS often Identified in line with latent pohcy goa s .  
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specialization, which are frequently not at play i n  treaty interpretation. The 
result is a system that does not track the core issues at play i n  treaty­
interpretation-deference questions. 
The inadequacies of these systems, coupled with the increasing 
importance of treaties. requires implementing a model of deference that 
accounts for relevant factors that have caused the Judiciary to engage in such 
inconsistent application o f  the great weight doctrine. 186 As demonstrated by 
the discussion above, different ci rcumstances require varied levels of 
deference. A model of deference based on the persuasiveness factors 
outlined in Skidmore moves us to a more flexible model of deference that can 
be tailored to address the dual concerns o f  the Judiciary and Executive. This 
calibrated scale, with factors addressing the particularities of treaties, is the 
only way to effectuate the obl igations and rights encompassed within the 
domestic realm while respecting their rol e  in international relations. 
· 1 50 at 1 300 ("[W]ithout an entrustment of continuing 186. See Van Alstme, supra note ' t · s is a sliding-scale deference administrative authority to an executive-branch agency, wh.a remam
 . ti f a  treaty and 
calibrated to the overall persuasiveness of a proffered executive-
branch mterpreta on o 
to any implications for our nation's foreign affairs."). 
